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THESIS

**DEVELOPING THE BEST METHODS OF INTERNAL
CONTRACTING SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYED MARINE
EXPEDITIONARY UNITS (MEU)**

by

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**DEVELOPING THE BEST METHODS OF CONTRACTING SUPPORT FOR
DEPLOYED MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS (MEU)**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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ABSTRACT

The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the Marine Corps' forward deployed force in readiness and as such advertises that it is self-sustaining for 15 days. The MEU Commander has latitude as to what personnel and assets he wants to deploy with. Because of this, each of the MEUs is different. This is especially the case involving internal contracting support. This research explores the differences in contracting support commonly provided to the MEUs and the external support available to the MEUs in their Areas of Responsibility (AOR). Based on this research, the author provides conclusions and recommendations that will optimize the internal support to the MEUs while deployed.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PREFACE

Containing approximately 2200 personnel, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is the Marine Corps' deployed force tasked to respond to contingencies worldwide. Each MEU is composed of the personnel and assets the MEU commander determines he requires to meet the missions for which it might be tasked while deployed. Because of this, there are differences in composition between each of the MEUs. For instance, one difference might center on how a MEU is provided contracting support. The purpose of this thesis is to examine these differences and to make recommendations for optimization of internal contracting support.

B. BACKGROUND

When the Marine Corps deploys, it deploys as task-organized units called Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF). The left side of Figure 1 demonstrates the command relationship between Combatant Commander and the Marine Corps, while the right side of the figure shows how the Marine Corps organizes into MAGTFs to respond to the corresponding threat level. The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest of the MAGTFs. There are three MEFs in the Marine Corps. I MEF is headquartered at Camp Pendleton, California; II MEF is in Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; and III MEF in Okinawa, Japan. The MEF commander establishes the three smaller MAGTFs with his internal personnel and equipment. Reserve augmentation is provided when necessary (normally major theater war). Besides the MEF, the MEU is the only other MAGTF operational every day. Normally, at least two MEUs are deployed somewhere around the

globe every day. Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) and Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTF) are stood up to respond to contingencies when required.




Figure 1. Marine Air Ground Task Force (From: USMC Strategy 21)

There are seven Marine Expeditionary Units in the Marine Corps: three (11th, 13th, and 15th MEUs) are home-based with I MEF, three (22d, 24th, and 26th MEUs) with II MEF, and one from III MEF (31st MEU). Figure 2 shows the areas of responsibility for the MEUs deployed outside the continental United States. The I MEF MEUs generally deploy to the Indian Ocean and are a force in readiness to respond to contingencies in East Africa, Southwest Asia, and South Asia. II MEF responsibility is Europe, and West Africa. They spend most of their deployments in the Mediterranean Sea. III MEF patrols the Far East. These units leave their home station for forward deployment aboard U.S. Navy ships as the landing force of an Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). They may or may not deploy to join a Carrier Battle Group. Once deployed, the ARG becomes a national asset for reaction to world crises and is under the

administrative control of the Fleet Commander of the area in which they are transiting. For instance, a MEU from Camp Pendleton trains under third fleet for a deployment to the Arabian Gulf. After it is deployed, operational control passes to 7th Fleet followed by 5th fleet when it goes through their respective areas of responsibility (AOR). Operational Control goes to the Combatant Commander of the area.




Figure 2. MEF Areas of Responsibility (From: USMC Strategy 21)

The Marine Corps advertises that the MEUs are self-supporting for 15 days and is capable of performing a myriad of missions on short notice from the National Command Authority. Each of the MEUs takes its own mix of personnel and equipment that the commander believes will allow him to meet the requirements of a six-month deployment. The MEU commander is constrained in his selection of equipment and personnel by ship space and availability of assets. Because of the importance of the MEUs mission, normally if the MEU commander deems he needs an asset for deployment, he will get it if he can fit it on the ship. For example, only one of the three MEUs (13th) on the west coast has recently deployed with tanks that take up a lot of space on board the ARG's ships. An example of personnel differences among the MEUs is that all II MEF MEUs deploy with one enlisted contract specialist (MOS 3044) while none of the I MEF or III MEF MEUs have 3044s assigned. It is the responsibility of the MEU commander to

identify any requirement shortfalls up the chain of command upon the receipt of orders for a specific mission. The Fleet commander normally sources shortfalls to other agencies under his command. This is how west coast MEUs normally receive contracting support when they deploy or receive a mission for a contingency operation.

The normal cycle (cycles may be shortened or lengthened based on world situation) for continental U.S. (CONUS) MEUs is six months of pre-deployment training, followed by six months deployment, and then six months of post deployment. The researcher will address the III MEF cycle in Chapter II. Figure 3 shows the command relationships in the MEU. All MEUs are composed of four Marine Corps elements that come together along with the Navy component to train (pre-deployment) for and conduct the deployment. The only element that remains a full time component of the MEU is the Command Element (CE). The other three elements are the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG), Battalion Landing Team (BLT), and the Aviation Combat Element (ACE). Referring back to Figure 1, the MSSG is tasked from the Force Service Support Group, the BLT is tasked from the Division, and the ACE from the Wing. These three units, personnel and equipment, go back to their parent commands at the conclusion of the deployment. Therefore, each time a MEU works up for deployment and deploys, it does so with different personnel and equipment in the MSSG, BLT, and ACE. It also has a different ARG. Since these units have not worked together previously, there is a great deal of coordination to be worked out during the pre-deployment training period to prepare for a successful deployment.




Figure 3. MEU Command Structure (From: Researcher Developed)

When a MEU leaves its home base for the deployment it normally has a training plan with exercises it intends to conduct in countries within its AOR. For example, 13th MEU left for their last deployment with exercises scheduled for United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. It is normally intended for all ships in the ARG, and therefore all components of the MEU, to remain together during the deployment. Occasionally however, contingencies may interrupt this training cycle and exercises may be canceled and new requirements placed on the entire MEU, or only a part of the ARG may be pulled away to perform another mission while the remainder of the MEU continues in the training plan. When the ships of the ARG are separated for different missions, this is referred to as “split ARG operations.”

Because of its importance in attaining requirements that the MEU could not deploy with, contracting support is one of the items that should be planned during pre deployment training. Where support will come from for contingencies not yet known as addressed in the previous paragraph must be addressed. At a minimum, there are five sources of contracted support for a deployed MEU:

1. MEU enlisted contract specialists
2. MEU Supply Officer

3. Naval Regional Contracting Centers
4. Husbanding services contractors in country
5. Other external support

C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

This thesis will compare and contrast the methods employed by the different MEUs in acquiring the necessary contracting support. By researching methods of contracting support by each MEU this study will determine the best processes available to the MEU commander. The objective will be to determine optimal contracting assets for a MEU while deployed while taking into consideration the characteristics of the area where the support will be required. The following research questions will guide the researcher in the pursuit of the thesis objective.

D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. Primary Research Question:

What is the United States Marine Corps' experience with contract support of deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and how might this information be used to enhance the support to deployed units?

2. Secondary Research Questions:

- (a) What are the current USMC policies with respect to contract support and how does the USMC typically provide support to deployed MEUs?
- (b) What are the various types of contract support required by deployed MEUs?
- (c) What are the current issues associated with the support methodologies chosen by the Marine Corps?
- (d) Are the current methods of providing contract support adequate and responsive to deployed unit needs?
- (e) Are alternative contract support methods available to deployed units? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with various contract support methodologies?
- (f) How might the USMC alter current practices to enhance the level of support provided to deployed MEUs?

E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS

The scope will include: (1) an examination of current contracting support procedures for the MEUs; (2) presentation of issues and concerns associated with the different methods of providing contracting support; and (3) analysis of what sources of contracting support are most appropriate for MEU deployments to include a survey of enlisted contract specialists to determine implications for increased responsibilities or billets.

F. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps:

Conduct a comprehensive literature search of Marine Corps Lessons Learned, professional magazine articles, unit standard operating procedures (SOPs), and command orders.

Conduct a survey of enlisted contract specialists.

Conduct interviews either in person, or by telephone, with MEU Supply Officers, contract specialists, contingency contracting officers, and other personnel as required.

G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH

This thesis is intended to benefit the Marine Corps in regards to planning for, and implementation of support to Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments. By possessing the optimal deployed contracting support, the MEU will be truly self-sustaining and provide the MEU commander with maximum flexibility in timely accomplishment of short-fused missions. This thesis will assist the MEU commander in making the decisions of what contracting assets to deploy with and what to request from higher headquarters as an internal deficiency.

H. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The first chapter contains a broad overview of a MEU and how it is comprised for deployment. Additionally this chapter introduces the subject MEU contracting support along with research criteria used in the conduct of this research effort.

Chapter II examines the missions a MEU must be prepared to perform during a deployment and the internal supply capabilities of each MEU. However, the focus of the Chapter will be on the deployments of each of the MEUs. It gives a broad overview of the deployment cycles of the MEUs with an introduction to the type of contracting support provided.

Chapter III contains detailed description of each of the different types of contracting support available to the MEU.

Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the research conducted with an introduction and examination of a survey of Marine Corps enlisted contracting specialists.

Chapter V presents specific conclusions derived from the research and any recommendations for improvement of the MEU contracting support effort. It concludes with a summary of the research questions and suggestions for further research.

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II. BACKGROUND

A. INTRODUCTION

As described in the preceding chapter, each of the MEUs deploys with the assets it believes it needs to accomplish assigned missions. This chapter first introduces the missions the MEU may be called upon to perform during its deployment and the type of contract support involved in those missions. Secondly, this chapter introduces the basic internal supply support capabilities inherent in all MEUs. Thirdly, this chapter describes typical deployment for each of the MEUs by the MEF. The biggest difference in deployments between each of the MEF's MEUs is where they are traveling and what they encounter in a typical deployment. Each deployment is different, so it is hard to define a typical deployment. For purposes of this thesis a typical deployment is a deployment in which MEU personnel depart the ship to participate in at least one major exercise, whether planned prior to deployment or a Combatant Commander directed contingency operation. An atypical deployment would be when a MEU has its exercises ashore canceled and spends the majority of its time afloat awaiting orders or conducts exercises with personnel only and no assets go ashore.

B. MEU CONTINGENCY OPERATION MISSIONS

During the pre-deployment workups, the MEUs train to perform the 29 different real world missions that it may be tasked with during their deployment. These missions are listed in Table 1, and vary in duration, size of the operation concerning how many personnel are involved, and logistical support required. The receipt of one of these missions during a deployment will denote a contingency operation and results in the cancellation of other planned training the MEU has scheduled and coordinated prior to

deployment. Many are special operations exercises (the direct action operations in Table 1) for which the MEU must get certified to perform prior to departing for deployment. This certification makes the MEU a MEU(SOC), or special operations capable.

Amphibious Operations	Supporting Operations
• Amphibious Assault	• Tactical Deception Operations
• Amphibious Raid	• Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations
• Amphibious Demonstration	• Airfield/Port Seizure
• Amphibious Withdrawal	• Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT)
Direct Action Operations	• Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S)
• In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR)	• Initial Terminal Guidance
• Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy Facilities	• Counterintelligence Operations
• Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS)	• Airfield/Port Seizure
• Special Demolition Operations	• Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)/Electronic Warfare
• Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP)	• Fire Support Planning, Control, and Coordination in a Joint/Combined Environment
• Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or Material	• Show of Force Operations
MOOTW	• JTF Enabling Operations
• Peace Operations	• Sniping Operations
• Security Operations	
• Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)	
• Reinforcement Operations	
• Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team	
• Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief	

Table 1. MEU Missions (From: Marine Corps Order 3120.9)

The MEU Supply Officer (SupO) must be prepared to support all of these missions and coordinate with contracting personnel for the requirements generated from the operation. The Direct action missions and many of the supporting operations

missions involve the use of few forces or no forces going ashore and little or no contracting support. Most of the amphibious operations and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) missions will involve large numbers of forces going ashore with a heavy contracting support requirement. The contracting requirements will also vary with the mission. An amphibious assault operation may involve the contracting of a large number of tractor-trailers for in land transportation, while an amphibious raid by its nature is a quick strike mission that should not require contracting.

The MOOTW missions are the most contracting intensive missions because they usually involve large numbers of Marines staying ashore and a larger contracting effort. Usually this brings with it the establishment of a base camp or command post and the life support needs that go with a base camp. Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions can require the most diverse requirements and are typically the hardest to get of any of the missions because they may not be available in the country you are supporting. Humanitarian assistance generally involves a heavy emphasis on acquiring food, medical, dental, and engineering supplies. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) may or may not already be on the ground when the MEU arrives, but if not, they will be there soon after and will be the lead agency in support operations. The Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) is the one MOOTW operation that varies greatly from the others. It involves a small number of forces and aircraft going ashore to evacuate U.S. civilian personnel from a hostile environment to a safe haven either aboard ship or a friendly country. Speed can be of utmost importance in a NEO to ensure the safe removal of noncombatants from a dangerous situation. It may require the use of aircraft external to the MEU who may bring their own contracting support. Once delivered to the safe haven

country, the contracting support for the evacuees becomes the responsibility of the Combatant Commander. Generally, the personnel evacuated include embassy personnel, of which there is a contracting officer.

C. MEU INTERNAL SUPPLY SUPPORT

Each element within the MEU has its own supply section and due to space constraints aboard ship deploys with limited administrative supplies, repair parts, and miscellaneous items to start the deployment. When one of the elements has a requirement they cannot fill, depending on the type of requirement, there are three potential internal sources of support to fill the requirement: the MSSG supply section, the ACE's aviation supply section, and the MEU supply/logistics section.

Figure 4 shows the supply requisition flow for the MEU. The MSSG supply section is responsible for providing resupply of items available through the Marine Corps supply system. These are typically equipment repair parts, lubricants, and containerized field rations (Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), or Tray rations). Each of the MEU elements is authorized to order directly from MSSG supply. Requisitions to MSSG Supply are either provided directly from the block of supplies the MSSG deployed with, or passed back to the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU) supporting them from their home base. These requisitions are prioritized and can take long lead times to be received. For most of these items, there is no alternative item available for purchase on the open market overseas. For instance, you wouldn't be able to find an M1-A1 tank track from a local vendor overseas.




Figure 4. Internal supply support flow chart (From: Researcher developed)

The ACE's aviation supply section has responsibility for filling all requisitions for aviation parts. This is done through the ship's aviation supply department, which the ACE has authority to deal directly with the ship for all these requirements. These requisitions are outside the scope of this research.

The MEU supply/logistics section maintains the fiscal records for the MEU and is the only element authorized to approve requisitions outside the Marine Corps supply system. Any requirement that is either not available through the Marine Corps supply system or cannot be received in a timely manner through the system, and an alternative might be available through a local vendor, is passed to the MEU supply section. The MEU SupO validates the requirement and if it can be purchased from stocks of supplies on the ship, he may decide to purchase it through the ship's Supply department. The ship stocks many items for the deployment also, and some requirements may be available through them. If coordinated in advance, some ship's supply officers will stock items for a MEU deployment. This can save critical storage space for the MEU, however the SupO may require that you purchase what he stocks in advance to guarantee that he doesn't get stuck with it. Finally, for those items that must be purchased from a local vendor, the MEU SupO will pass it to his contracting representative, either internal or external to the MEU. Chapter III will address the different contracting alternatives open to the MEU.

The one purchasing option internal to all MEUs is the Government Purchase Card. Depending on the arrangements made with the contracting office prior to deployment, the purchasing authority on these cards is either \$2,500 or \$25,000. The dollar value has varied depending upon the base from which base they have deployed. This option will be discussed further in Chapter III.

The MEU has the internal capability to pay their invoices through their Disbursing Officer (DisbO). The DisbO's main mission is to provide cash to the Marines aboard ship for purchase of personal items and enjoyment during port calls, however the

MEU SupO needs to establish a good working relationship early with the DisbO. The SupO must ensure that the DisbO deploys with enough cash and understands that he must make himself available for the rear party to closeout all invoices. The DisbO has unlimited check writing authority to pay an authorized invoice, however in many countries vendors will accept cash only because of the unstable banking or monetary system. The MEU SupO, or his contracting representative, needs to identify the payment situation during pre deployment planning conferences.

D. I MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS

I MEF MEUs do not deploy with a contingency contracting officer, additionally, the MEU Supply Officer does not possess a warrant, and their Government purchase card limit is \$2,500. The six-month pre-deployment training period is crucial to establish the contracting support working relationships for the deployment. During this time the MEU builds up its block of supplies with which it will deploy, conducts planning conferences overseas in the area it will be deploying, and coordinates with the supporting Supply Battalion at Camp Pendleton.

When the I MEF MEU builds its initial block of supplies that are not available through the supply system for the deployment, they depend on the contracting personnel at the base contracting office. The MEU follows the same administrative procedures as any other unit aboard Camp Pendleton; the contracting office does not dedicate a representative to fill the requirements of the MEU. The advantage the MEU has over any other unit aboard the base is the priority of the requests is normally higher. The MEU is on an accelerated training cycle prior to deployment and generally all requisitions for open purchase are highest priority and the required delivery date is normally short fused.

Three months prior to deployment the MEU is authorized to increase its highest priority requisitions to 02, a priority given to only a few other units with high priority missions on base. The base contracting office is normally responsive with no significant complaints from recent MEU SupOs.

I MEF MEUs make the longest trip of any of the MEUs. Departing from California, they travel across the globe to the Arabian Gulf or East Africa. There are four different kinds of stops a MEU can make in foreign countries during its deployment: “sustainment training”, exercise training, port calls, and contingency missions.

The I MEF MEUs transit is so long that they typically do “sustainment training” in Hawaii, Singapore and/or Australia so that the skills they developed in the workups are sustained. Total cost for this sustainment training is low for all three locations with no individual contract requirement exceeding \$25,000. In Hawaii, the base contracting office at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii supports the few contracting requirements (e.g. portable toilets, cell phones, pagers, transportation,) much the same way as though they were at Camp Pendleton. The MEU SupO can coordinate this support in advance via phone, E-Mail, Fax, and an advanced party arriving a week prior. The Singapore Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) supports training in Singapore. The MEU SupOs interviewed felt the NRCC was very responsive to the needs of the MEU. The contracting effort is almost exclusively transportation of Marines from the ship to the training sites on the island and cell phones and pagers. Any other requirements might involve limited items the MEU forgot to deploy with, computer parts, or copier/office equipment repair the ship personnel can’t perform. The MEU SupO can coordinate this support in advance via phone, E-Mail, Fax, and an advanced party

arriving a couple days prior. If the MEU does sustainment training in Australia, the NRCC Singapore office coordinates the use of the existing husbanding contract. MEUs have coordinated this support with E-Mail, fax, phone and advance party. One MEU conducted a Final Planning Conference with NRCC Singapore, and host nation support personnel prior to deployment.

Each I MEF MEU normally deploys with a training schedule consisting of three exercises, normally in the Arabian Gulf area or east Africa. The list of countries in which exercises have been conducted over the past three years includes: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kenya and Djibouti. One of these exercises is normally a major exercise involving the entire MEU. It will consist of either an amphibious offload aboard Navy landing craft or an administrative offload pier-side. Once offloaded, inland transportation (tractor-trailers, busses) are required to transport assets and personnel to the training area usually at least 20 miles in land. At the training area a base camp is set up for a command base and support base for the training. This support base may require contracting for engineering and life support needs such as lumber, nails, fresh fruits and vegetables, bottled water, ice, refrigerated trailers, portable toilets, etc. Once the exercise is concluded, transportation is required to return the vehicles and personnel to the ship. The two smaller exercises the MEU will participate in will normally involve smaller size units going ashore with little contracting required. Normally contracting support for these exercises will be coordinated during planning conferences prior to deployment. These conferences will involve trips to each of the countries in which training will be conducted plus Bahrain, headquarters of Navy Central Command (NAVCENT) and Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT). The

NRCC Naples detachment in Bahrain is responsible for coordinating this contracting support. Depending on the country in which the exercise will be conducted, NRCC Bahrain has supported these exercises in the past with a warranted contracting officer possessing an unlimited warrant, Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) established with multiple vendors for use by the MEU SupO, contracting from Bahrain, and establishing relationships between the MEU SupO and the husbanding agent for the country. The only occurrence of an individual contracting requirement exceeding \$100,000 was in Jordan in 1997 and 1999 for aviation fuel. Each of the MEU SupOs felt satisfied that, even though some difficulties were encountered at times, prior planning was sufficient to provide all contracting needs of these exercises during deployment.

Port calls are normally administrative in nature and allow the Marines and Sailors to get a little liberty. Many times they are at smaller ports to give a boost to the local economy. Contracting needs for vehicles and cell phones/pagers are normally coordinated through the ships SupO in his Logistics Requirements (LogReq) message and received from the husbanding agent when the ship pulls into port.

Whereas the other stops during the deployment have been preplanned and the contracting effort preplanned with the supporting organization, contingency operations, as discussed earlier in this thesis, or additional port calls may be directed by the Combatant Commander on short notice. Additional port calls are no problem to coordinate on short notice, as they are simple efforts usually arranged through the ship SupO. Contingency operations may be quite difficult. The ARG commander must request contracting support upon receipt of the mission. Usually this support comes from

the NRCC in the AOR. Table 2 lists the contingencies I MEF MEUs have participated in since 1997.

Name	Location	Date	Unit	Type of Contingency
Silent Assurance	Qatar	Nov 1997	13 th	Security Operation
Desert Thunder I	Kuwait	Feb-May 1998	11 th	Show of Force
Safe Departure	Eritrea	June 1998	11 th	NEO
Desert Thunder II	Kuwait	Nov 1998	15 th	Show of Force
Resolute Response	Kenya	Dec 1997-Apr. 1998	13 th	Security Operations
Cancelled	Eritrea/Somalia	March-Apr 1999	13 th	NEO
International Force	East Timor	Oct 1999- Dec 2000	11 th , 13 th , 15 th	Peace Keeping
JTF Determined Response	Yemen	Nov 2000	13 th	Security Operations

Table 2. I MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From: Researcher developed)

As discussed earlier, these contingency operations can range from requiring a large presence of the MEU with the majority of the MEU going ashore requiring a major contracting effort, as in Operation Desert Thunder in Kuwait, to small detachments requiring little or no contracting support (the remainder of the exercises in the table would fall in this category). The canceled NEO in Eritrea is an example of a MEU receiving a warning order for a mission and never conducting the mission even though contracting support was provided. NRCC Det Bahrain has supported these exercises by providing a contracting officer in country. In Kuwait, contracting was handed off to the ARCENT contracting office in Camp Doha. The MEU SupOs interviewed were all pleased with the contracting support they received on these exercises except in Kuwait

where he complained of the frustrations of dealing with the bureaucracy. The SupOs preferred having a single point of contact to go to for their needs.

E. II MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS

II MEF MEUs deployments are similar to those of I MEF except for the length of transit. There is generally not a need for the MEU to conduct sustainment training prior to arrival in their AOR. Like their counterparts from the west coast, they deploy with a training plan with exercises and port calls for which they have attended pre-deployment planning conferences and face the uncertainty of having this training plan disrupted by contingency operations in their AOR. Contracting requirements are typically the same as a west coast MEU depending on the type of operation or training exercise

The II MEF MEUs conduct the majority of their training in the Mediterranean Sea even though their AOR also includes Western Africa. Over the past three years training has been conducted in Albania, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kosovo, Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and Turkey. Table 3 lists the contingency operations that II MEF MEUs have participated in since 1997. The table shows that some of these Operations go on for years and may develop into new missions/operations, as is the case in the former Yugoslavia. Flare-ups and/or relief forces in place may involve the use of MEUs being called into these regions on a continuing basis. This is also the case with I MEF in Kuwait.

Name	Location	Date	Unit	Type of Contingency
Determined Guard	Adriatic Sea	1997	22 nd , 24 th , 26 th	Show of Force
Joint Guard	Bosnia-Herzegovina	1997	22 nd , 24 th , 26 th	Peace Keeping
Silver Wake	Albania	Mar-Jul 97	26 th	NEO
Noble Obelisk	Sierra Leone	June 97	22 nd	NEO
Desert Thunder I	Kuwait	June 98	24 th	Show of Force
Joint Forge	Bosnia-Herzegovina	June 98- Jan 99	22 nd , 24 th , 26 th	Peace Keeping
Embassy Security	Albania	Aug-Dec 98	22 nd , 24 th	Security Operations
Shining Hope	Albania	Apr.-Jul 99	24 th , 26 th	Security Ops, HAO
Noble Anvil	Kosovo	Feb-Jul 99	24 th , 26 th	Show of Force

Table 3. II MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From: Researcher developed))

A major difference between I MEF and II MEF deployments is the likelihood of split ARG operations in which the ships of the MEU separate to perform different missions. This is common with II MEF MEUs, while very infrequent with I MEF MEUs. Each of the SupOs interviewed from the east coast had experienced split ARG ops or will in his next deployment, while only two from the west coast experienced split ARG ops. In the case of the I MEF MEUs, external contracting was required by only one half of the MEU when split in both instances. Each of the II MEF MEU SupOs stated that external contracting support was required at least once by each half of the MEU while split. One SupO addressed the need to do planning/advance party for follow on operations while another operation is still going:

Sometimes I wish we had another contracting specialist with us, but we make do...Another problem is concurrent planning of exercises while another exercise is in progress. Often, the 3044 or ordering officer needs to be part of an advance party or planning conference to begin making contracting arrangements for an upcoming exercise, but there are other exercises on-going. We solved this problem by having three ordering officers besides the 3044. (Ref. 1)

F. III MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS

III MEF MEU (31st MEU) deployments are quite different from those of I and II MEF. Because of the forward presence of the base from which they deploy, Okinawa, Japan, the 31st MEU is already in its area of responsibility (AOR). Even though in the past couple of years they have deployed to the Arabian Gulf, their AOR consists of the Far East. They routinely conduct training in Australia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, and Guam. Because the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) comes from Camp Pendleton, California, the pre-deployment training cycle in Okinawa is also condensed. The total length of the deployment for the BLT is six months long. Therefore to get their entire workup training completed, they start it Camp Pendleton and complete it on Okinawa with the remainder of the MEU. Deployments are usually three months or shorter and involve one major exercise.

Table 4 shows the contingency operations performed by 31st MEU since 1997. As stated earlier, even though the Middle East is not their AOR, they responded to contingency operations in that area in late 1998, early 1999. The reason for this was to ease the deployment schedule of the I MEF MEUs so that a MEU may be in the area during the period when Iraq was threatening noncompliance with U.N. resolutions for arms inspection. (Ref. 2:p. 23) In the past, 31st MEUs have deployed with a 3044, but the most recent MEU SupOs have been granted limited contracting warrants. They have

also received contracting support from other component commands as a component of joint exercises.

Name	Location	Date	Type of Contingency
Desert Thunder II	Kuwait	Nov 98	Show of Force
Desert Fox	Kuwait	Dec 98	Security Operations
Maritime Interdiction Operations	Arabian Gulf	Jan-Feb 99	VBSS
International Force	East Timor	Oct 1999- Dec 2000	Peace Keeping

Table 4. III MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From: Researcher developed)

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

Although each of the MEFs has its own way of supporting its MEUs while deployed, all seven MEUs have the same organization, the same general deployment structure, are expected to perform the same missions, and generate the same requirements. The differences of these deployments are in the length of transit and the countries in which they operate, this gives the II MEF MEUs more time spent in their AOR and a more extensive training plan. This may or may not be a justification to why they deploy with a 3044. The next chapter will discuss each of the methods of MEU contracting support in detail and will illuminate what is available to each of the MEUs while deployed.

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III. SOURCES OF CONTRACTING SUPPORT

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the different alternatives to support the MEUs. As addressed in the previous chapter, each MEU uses these alternatives in different ways. This discussion will focus on what support each can provide and how these sources are used by the MEU. It is the MEU Supply Officer's responsibility to arrange the contracting support for any MEU requirements that are not available through the Marine Corps supply system. During the course of a deployment, a MEU SupO may use any combination of these methods to support the MEU.

B. MEU SUPPLY OFFICER/SUPPLY PERSONNEL

The MEU SupO and the logistics officer (S-4), have to decide what tools they want to use during the deployment to support their command with the necessary contracting abilities. These tools may include arranging contracting authority of some sort for the MEU SupO and/or other supply personnel like the supply chief or fiscal chief. Contracting authority open to the MEU SupO includes: the Government-wide Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC), ordering official authority against established contracts, and a contracting warrant.

The MEU SupO by billet is the approving official for all GCPC card-holders under his charge and receives a one day training class from the base Regional Contracting Office (RCO). These purchases are considered micro-purchases with a dollar limit of \$2,500. Competition requirements for these purchases are:

Micro-purchases may be awarded without soliciting competitive quotations if the contracting officer determines that the price is reasonable. Although competition is not required, these purchases must be equitably distributed among qualified suppliers. Whenever feasible, a quotation should be solicited from a source other than a previous supplier before placing a repeat order, if possible. (Ref. 3: Ch 3, para. 4a)

The MEU SupO can attend the four-day NAVSUP simplified acquisitions course to receive an increased GCPC authority of \$25,000. The focus of the training and target audience are:

Focus: To teach the simplified acquisition methods to individuals who will be purchasing supplies or services for the Government on a part time basis, and use of the purchase card above the micro-purchase threshold under Letters of Agreement, GSA contract and Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (ITDC), and for purchases made OCONUS for commercial items up to \$25,000. Procurement laws, regulations, and procedures are covered extensively.

Target Audience: Individuals who will purchase supply or services for the Government on a part time basis, and cardholders who will have the authority to place orders against LOAs, IDTCs, GSA Contracts, and to purchase commercial items overseas up to \$25,000, and Approving Officials over them. (Ref. 4)

The following are the DFARS requirements for overseas GCPC purchases up to \$25,000.

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 213.301 authorizes the use of the Purchase Card, on a stand-alone basis, for purchases up to \$25,000, if the acquisition meets the following six specific requirements:

1. Is made outside the U.S. for use outside the U.S.
 2. Is a commercial item.
 3. Is not for use by employees recruited within the U.S.
 4. Is not for supplies or services identified in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Subpart 25.7.
 5. Is not ball/roller bearings as end items.
 6. Does not require access to Classified or Privacy Act information.
- (Ref. 5)

As an ordering official, a MEU SupO can make delivery orders against existing contracts up to the amount specified in their appointment. MCO 4200.15G states the requirements for appointing ordering officers:

Prior to appointment of ordering officers, the individual shall, as a minimum have completed the Purchasing Fundamentals Course (Pur 101). Only those duly appointed ordering officers are authorized to place orders against existing contracts subject to the limitations prescribed by the appointing official. (Ref. 6: para. 2102.2a-b)

The 4 day NAVSUP course mentioned above has met the training requirements for the east coast SupOs to deploy with ordering officer authority. The most recent deployed with a ordering limit of \$25,000 per purchase. Appendix B is an example of an appointing order and acceptance.

The last method of internal contracting support is for the MEU SupO to deploy with a contracting warrant. Although MCO P4200.15G states that the MEU Supply Officers may be appointed as a contracting officer, this capability has only recently been used. The last 31st MEU SupO deployed with a contracting warrant and the current SupO will deploy with a warrant with limitations that it could not be used in any situations where other Government contracting officers were available. (Dalton) MCO P4200.15G addresses the steps that a unit needs to take to be able to procure goods and services in foreign countries in excess of \$2,500:

- a. The commanding officer will obtain authority from the CMC (LBO) to establish a purchasing office within the unit.
- b. The commanding officer will nominate an individual by name (normally the supply officer) to the CMC (LBO) as contracting officer. The CMC will appoint the individual. (Ref. 6: para. 8201.2)

Table 5 shows the capabilities that each of the MEUs commonly deploys with. The east coast SupOs have taken advantage of the NAVSUP course addressed above to become ordering officers (one SupO arranged training for additional supply personnel). (Ref. 1) None of the east coast SupOs have deployed with the with \$25,000 GCPC card authority, but their 3044 routinely has a \$100,000 limit. The last two 31st MEU SupOs have been granted both contracting authority and the \$25,000 GCPC limit. (Ref. 7) West Coast MEU SupOs have received no purchasing training prior to deployments, thus deploys with a \$2,500 GCPC limit and no ordering officer authority.

MEU	\$25,000 GCPC	Ordering Officer	Contracting Authority
East Coast	No	Yes	No
West Coast	No	No	No
31 st MEU	Yes	Yes	Yes

Table 5. MEU Capabilities by MEF

C. ENLISTED CONTRACT SPECIALIST

Appendix A lists Enlisted Contract Specialists, Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 3044, billets designated in the Marine Corps. Of the 94 total active duty billets in the Marine Corps, there are 21 billets designated as contingency contracting, the remainder of the billets are generally base support contracting billets. They reside within the Supply Company of the Supply Battalion within the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) of each MEF. The FSSG Contingency Contracting Officer, a Marine Corps commissioned officer MOS 9656, is responsible for training and assignments of the 3044s in his charge. A description of the MOS follows:

Purchasing and contracting specialists perform various duties incident to the acquisition of supplies and non-personal services purchased via open market from commercial and government sources. Marines in this MOS must have the ability to work independently and be objective in applying purchasing and contracting laws and regulations in daily activities. (Ref. 8: para 3121.3a)

3044s are enlisted Marines who have moved in to the MOS normally from the administrative supply clerk MOS of 3043. The prerequisites for application to the MOS are as follows:

1. Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Clerical (CL) score of 110 or higher.
2. Must be interviewed and recommended by the Regional Contracting Officer.
3. Must be at least a sergeant with less than 2 years time in grade (waiverable to corporal) on second or subsequent enlistment with primary MOS 3043 (Primary MOS 3043 may be waived, on a case-by-case basis, when recommended by Regional Contracting Officer)
4. No convictions by court-martial, civilian courts, or nonjudicial punishment of any act involving larceny, fraud, or theft.
5. Must have excellent communicative skills, both verbally and in writing.
6. Have at minimum of 36 months of obligated service upon assignment of intended MOS.
7. Be able to type 45 words per minute, and have a general aptitude for computers.
8. Lateral move requests shall be approved through Occupational Field (OccFld) sponsor (Code LBO). (Ref. 8: para 3121.3b)

Once approved for the MOS, the 3044 is placed in a probationary period:

1. Marines who lateral move into this MOS from outside OccFld 30 will be assigned MOS 3000 with an intended MOS of 3044. All Marines will be assigned to a Regional Contracting Office for a period of 6 months for OJT. At the completion of OJT and upon the recommendation of the Regional Contracting Officer, these Marines will be assigned MOS 3044.

2. If after the Marine is assigned the 3044 MOS and is found unacceptable within the first 24 months of being assigned to a Regional Contracting Office, the Regional Contracting Officer can submit a request to CMC MMSA/LBO requesting to administratively drop the Marine from MOS 3044. back to their original MOS or another. (Ref. 8: para 3121.3b.9-10)

The Department of the Navy (DoN) Director, Acquisition Career Management (DACM) office allows enlisted personnel to serve in the purchasing career field. (Ref 9) The training and education certification requirements for 3044s are:

1. Sergeants (E-5) must complete Level I contracting course requirements of the Defense Acquisition Career Development Program (CON 101) to be eligible for certification in the contracting career field. Prerequisites for this program require either a baccalaureate degree or at least 24 semester hours of undergraduate work (DANTES or CLEP equivalency exams may be included) among accounting, law, business finance, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, organization and management in addition to one year of experience in contracting to be eligible for Level I certification in the contracting career field.
2. Staff sergeants (E-6) through master gunnery sergeants (E-9) must have completed Level I certification requirements and the Level II contracting course requirements of the Defense Acquisition Career Development Program (CON 202) in addition to a total of two years of contracting experience to be eligible for Level II certification in the contracting career field. (Ref. 8: para 3121.3b.11-12)

3044 Marines who are selected to deploy with a MEU have completed the requisite first tour, two-year probation period and are in at least their second tour. The FSSG contingency contracting officer is responsible for providing the warrant to the 3044 chosen to deploy with the MEU. The 3044s who deployed in support of the SupOs

interviewed were granted warrants up to the simplified acquisition threshold of \$100,000, with delivery order authority up to the limit of the contract. They have routinely joined the MEU at the beginning of the pre-deployment training period and stayed with them through the six-month post-deployment training period. This amount of the warrant increases to \$250,000 in a declared contingency.

The reason the Marine Corps has enlisted contracting personnel in contingency contracting billets is to meet contracting requirements for units when they deploy outside the continental United States (CONUS) for contingency operations. (Ref 10) In order to be prepared to do this, they need the experience of contracting in a foreign environment. The MEUs are the Marine Corps only CONUS units that deploy on a regular basis. The units of III MEF train in foreign countries away from their home station on a regular basis. Other than this, opportunities for 3044s to get experience contracting a foreign country are hard to come by. Major Begin, the First FSSG Contingency Contracting Officer addressed the difficulty of getting his Marines deployed overseas in support of exercises when asked if he believed his 3044s get enough deployed contracting experience he stated " Only recently, and only because we have been working every angle to get Marines deployed." (Ref 11) There are opportunities for deployment in support of major combined exercises overseas, however the Marine Corps has not been aggressive in pursuing these billets. The Marine Corps does currently have a commitment of supporting the coalition forces in the Balkans with three enlisted contract specialists. (Ref 13) Major Begin believed that the Air Force enlisted contracting specialists are so good at their craft because they do it all the time and that the reason 3044s don't get as many opportunities is because of the apathy of major commands

toward contract planning. There are no staff contracting billets at Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) commands and the I and II MEF contracting officers have historically been given non-contracting duties. The current I MEF contracting officer is working in the G-2 (intelligence), and the II MEF contracting officer is working in G-3 (Training and Operations). (Ref. 12)

The 3044 who deploys with the II MEF MEUs deploy as a member of the MSSG by Table of Organization (T/O), however, he works for the MEU SupO in the command element logistics section. The MEU SupO writes his fitness report. He deploys with a \$100,000 warrant and can write delivery orders against existing contracts up to the limit of the contract. In the rare occurrence of requirements greater than \$100,000, he can request assistance from NRCC Naples, Italy or their home station at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina for assistance. Of the three MEU SupOs interviewed, covering five deployments, there was one instance in which the MEU had contracting requirements in excess of \$100,000 that was not covered by the Mediterranean Logistics Support (MLS) contract. In 1999, 26th MEU, received the assistance of the contingency contracting office in Camp LeJeune to assist in contracting for aviation landing rights/ramp fees in Croatia. (Ref 14) Each of the MEU SupOs addressed the ability of the MLS contract to meet almost all their requirements. This contract vehicle will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter

Enlisted contract specialists who meet the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) training requirements may receive warrants with limits above the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT). Also, those who do not meet the

requirements can receive a waiver and granted authority above the SAT. Out of the five east coast deployments covered in this thesis, all 3044s had limits below the SAT.

D. NAVAL REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTERS

There are two major Naval Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC) in the world, located in Naples, Italy and Singapore. The mission of these NRCCs is to provide fleet and base support for US Navy, Military Sealift and Coast Guard ships; US bases and facilities; contingency operations; and continental US activities requiring supplies and services from countries in their AOR. Each of these offices has branch offices to help them perform their mission. The Naples, Italy office has detachments in London and Bahrain while Singapore has detachments in Hong Kong, Indonesia, and the Philippines. This thesis will examine the support of the Naples, Bahrain, and Singapore offices as they have provided support to the MEUs in their AORs.

1. NRCC NAPLES, ITALY

The Naples Italy NRCC supports the east coast MEUs in the Mediterranean Sea and east Africa. They attend pre-deployment exercise planning conferences and give a brief of their capabilities to the MEU staff prior to deployment. Since the MEUs deploy with an enlisted contracting specialist, their interface with the MEU during deployment is mostly advisory in nature. They are available to assist the 3044 with requirements that exceed their contracting authority, i.e. purchases greater than \$100,000.

The greatest assistance that the NRCC Naples office has provided to the MEUs is the comprehensive listing of husbanding contracts it has established. The Mediterranean Logistics Services (MLS) husbanding contract, of which the contractors are listed in Appendix C, covers 20 countries with ports in the Mediterranean Sea. The MLS is a

requirement contract that specifically requires Navy and Marine Corps to acquire required contract items from this contract. The following is directly from the contract, to include the bold type:

This contract is an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contract for Units of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, and NATO.

Except as provided below, this requirements contract will obligate the United States Navy **and the U. S. Marine Corps** to acquire the following supplies and services from the contractor at the prices established within the contract except when the port tariff is lower:

Husbanding Services for U.S. Navy Ships (USS), Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) ships of the Military Sealift Command, and U.S. Coast Guard Ships (USCG) throughout the Mediterranean Sea and including The Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli and Jordanian ports, the Sea of Marmara, Azores Islands, Canary Islands, Madeira, and Portugal;

- All supplies and services offered associated with the port visit set out in the Section entitled "Supplies\Services and Prices" including the Unique Port Services described herein;
- Services in support of Operations Other than War as described herein throughout the Mediterranean Sea and including the Sea of Marmara, Azores Islands, Canary Islands, Madeira, and Portugal.

Exceptions:

- (a) any supplies or services which the U.S. Government may furnish within its own capabilities, or via host nation support.
- (b) ships operating outside the Command and Control of the 6th Fleet, 2nd Fleet, or other U.S. Navy Fleets.
- (c) whenever there are existing U.S. Government or foreign government capabilities in the port, the government will have the choice whether to order supplies or services from U. S. or foreign government facilities, or from the contractor.
- (d) whenever ship repair work is being done in conjunction with the Port Visit.
- (e) whenever a fixed price product or service listed in this contract is available at a lower price under a port tariff. (Ref 15.: p. 3)

The requirements contract does have a minimum order amount of \$2,500 for required purchases: "When the Government requires supplies or services covered by this contract in an amount of less than \$2500.00 per instance, the Government is not obligated to purchase, nor is the Contractor obligated to furnish, those supplies or services under the contract." (Ref 15.: Section IV.B.12.a, p. 9)

Listed in Appendix D are husbanding services contractors in all countries along the west coast of Africa with which NRCC Naples has contracts. Except for Kosovo, the MEUs have not performed an exercise in a country that is not covered by one of these contracts.

2. NRCC BAHRAIN

NRCC Bahrain detachment has taken a more hands on approach to supporting the west coast MEUs. They have supported the MEUs through three methods: 1. Providing a contracting officer in direct support, 2. Setting up Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) with local vendors for the SupO to place orders against, 3. Providing Husbanding Agents.

When the NRCC provides a contracting officer, he is a civilian Government contracting officer with an unlimited warrant. He attends all planning conferences in the exercise country and coordinates with the MEU SupO and U.S. personnel in country for support during the exercise. In support of the exercise, he deploys to meet the MEUs advanced party and stays through the rear party to close out all contracts. He works alongside the MEU SupO to provide all external contracting support.

NRCC Bahrain has established BPAs in Kuwait with the MEU SupOs designated as ordering officers. Training was provided to the MEU SupO during planning conference trips to Bahrain. These BPAs were established with logistics companies and

written with a broad scope to include anything the SupO required, much as a husbanding contractor. The ordering limit has been \$25,000 per order. These BPAs were established in Kuwait in late 1998 at the request of the Army Central Command Kuwait (ARCENT-KU) contracting office. (Ref. 16)

The third option the NRCC has used in support of MEUs is through husbanding contractors. Appendix E lists the husbanding contractors from their office. As late as early 1999 there was no husbanding contractor in Kuwait. Even though he did not receive the requisite training as discussed earlier to become an ordering officer, one MEU SupO was supported through a husbanding services contractor in the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

3. NRCC SINGAPORE

NRCC Singapore has directly supported the west coast MEUs sustainment training in Singapore as discussed in Chapter 2. Also, even though they have not received the required ordering officer training, the MEUs have also used their husbanding contracts in Australia. 13th MEU used the Darwin contract to support operations in both Australia and to fly in support to East Timor. Appendix F lists the husbanding services contracts in place from the NRCC Singapore office. The following gives guidance on receiving contracting support in ports not provided with husbanding services contracts:

Not all ports visited by Navy ships operating in the Western Pacific Region are covered in this instruction. Many small ports are visited so infrequently that establishing contractual coverage for supplies and services is impractical. Additions or revisions to this guide will be published as additional contracts are awarded or port service information is gathered. For Supplies/Services required but not listed in this guide, please send an unclassified message describing your requirements in plain language to the appropriate activity from the list shown below, information copy to NAVREGCONTNEN SINGAPORE.

Include the required delivery date(s) and location(s). Where applicable, include accounting data.

Singapore	NAVREGCONTGEN SINGAPORE
Malaysia	USDAO KUALA LUMPUR
Philippines	USDAO MANILA RP
Indonesia	USDAO JAKARTA/NRCC SINGAPORE DET JAKARTA/ID
Eastern	USDAO CANBERRA/COMAUSNAVSUP
Western	COMSEVENTHFLT REP WESTERN AS
Thailand	USDAO BANGKOK TH
Fiji	USDAO SUVA
Hong Kong	SHIPSUPPOFF HONG KONG HK
Manila	NRCC SINGAPORE DET MANILA

These activities will either coordinate your requirements with a husbanding agent or place the order for your requirements directly. In either case, you will receive a message update on the status of your requirements.

(Ref. 17: para. 102)

E. HUSBANDING SERVICES CONTRACTORS/AGENTS

There seems to be confusion over the use of the terms husbanding services contractor and husbanding agent, but there is a very important legal distinction between the two terms. A contractor is defined simply as a person or entity that enters into a contract, or a person who performs services but is not an employee, often called an "independent contractor." (Ref. 18) The term agent provides the subject person or entity much greater power in acting on behalf of the other entity in the relationship as described here:

agent: n. a person who is authorized to act for another (the agent's principal) through employment, by contract or apparent authority. The importance is that the agent can bind the principal by contract or create liability if he/she causes injury while in the scope of the agency. Who is an agent and what is his/her authority are often difficult and crucial factual issues.(Ref. 18)

None of the husbanding contracts written by the three NRCCs establishes an agency relationship between the contractor and the Government. The MLS contract states that it is an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) requirements contract, and all Singapore husbanding contracts specify the relation of the contractor to the Government:

(a) DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR RELATIONSHIP. The awardee of this contract is an independent contractor of the U.S. Navy. No agency relationship exists between the awardee and the U.S. Navy. The Contractor shall not state or imply that it is an agent of the U.S. Navy in communications with other parties. (Ref. 19: Section III (a))

These contracts are written to support Navy ships requirements when they arrive in port in the country for which the contract is written. Many of these items are Navy specific such as lighterage, fenders, cranes, etc, however, they are useful to Marine Corps units because they routinely include such items as rental vehicles, cell phones, and fresh fruits and vegetables. Also the contract calls for the contractor to provide other supplies and services the Government may require. The contractor receives a fee to provide this service and He cannot add an additional charge to the invoices for these items. Although the NRCC Singapore refers to a husbanding agent, they are referring to a husbanding services contractor by describing these purchases.

The husbanding agent should be asked to arrange for the purchase of required supplies/services. The husbanding contract contains provisions requiring the husbanding agent to obtain supplies/services at reasonable prices, using competition, where possible. The husbanding agent is also required to submit copies of dealer invoices to the ship for reimbursement at cost. Remember, however, the husbanding agent is not a contracting officer. **It is the ship's Supply Officer, in the role of contracting officer, who must determine that the price to be paid is fair and reasonable.**(Ref. 17: para. 304)

The MEU SupO can order these items through the Ship's SupO or, if authorized by the NRCC, or the contract itself, as the MLS contract does, he can order directly through the husbanding contractor. Prior to arrival at a port, the ship's SupO will send a Logistics Request (LOGREQ) message to the NRCC or U.S. Defense Attache Office (USDAO) of its contract requirements. For ease of handling, the MEU can provide funding to the ship and combine their requests with the ship's. This is routine for administrative port calls. Exercise support is normally done by separate liaison.

F. OTHER CONTRACTING SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES

1. Joint Environment

Contracting for joint exercises and contingency operations in other countries may be controlled by another service. MCO P4200.15C states this relationship:

The responsibility for the purchase of locally available supplies and the leasing of real property in foreign countries is assumed by the senior Armed Forces commander present. By joint area services agreement, all other Armed Forces in the area are normally required to submit requirements for locally available supplies, services, or facilities to a central purchasing agency for purchasing action. However, in those areas where no locally established supply channels exist for local purchase, the purchasing officer may be required to initiate action to purchase certain locally available, common use-type items, services, or facilities for the accomplishment of the unit's mission. The methods and procedures to be utilized in fulfilling these requirements, until such time as support is available through locally established supply channels or as directed by higher authority, are contained herein. (Ref. 6: 8201.1)

In these instances, contracting support may be provided through another Government or DoD agency established as the lead agency.

The Army has adopted the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) program for logistical support for operations overseas. MEUs have received support

from the LOGCAP contractors in both Kuwait and the Balkans during the many deployments to those areas since they became trouble spots. Access to these contractor services requires the MEU to provide funding to the local Army command's resource management office and to send requirements through the local contracting office.

2. CONUS Support

If the MEU is not able to contract their requirements in the country in which they are operating, they can submit the requisition back to the supporting SMU. The deployed Support Unit in the Supply Battalion of the supporting FSSG will arrange for the contracting and shipment of all CONUS based support.

G. CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter demonstrated that there are a multitude of options open to the MEU for contracting support while deployed. Internal assets can be extensive with a 3044, a MEU contracting officer with ordering officer authority or contracting warrant, the GCPC credit card and additional MEU supply personnel trained as ordering officers. If internal contracting assets are not available, there are many means of receiving the proper support. The NRCCs and other agencies deployed to an area have the capacity to meet all the needs of the Marine Expeditionary Units. The next chapter will introduce and analyze the results of the researcher's survey and compare the different internal support alternatives available to the MEU.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the researcher's survey of 3044s and analyzes the data from the responses. Additionally, the researcher will compare the different internal support alternatives available to the MEU.

B. SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA COLLECTED

The survey of 3044s was solicited through an E-Mail distributed by the researcher to the Headquarters Marine Corps enlisted contracting chief, and each of the base and contingency contracting officers. The E-Mail contained a link to the survey which was web based through Naval Postgraduate School. There were 16 questions, seven of which pertained to all 3044s. The nine remaining questions were directed at 3044s who had deployed with a MEU. Appendix G lists the survey questions. There were 47 respondents, 6 of which had MEU contracting experience. Question number one asked for respondents' rank. The following is the breakdown of respondents by rank:




Figure 5. Survey question 1 results.

Question number two asked for total time in service. The average time in service for the respondents was 13 years, 3 months. The range of years of service was from four years, three months to 23 years, two months. Question 2 data:

Range	Mean	Median	Mode
4 yrs, 3 mos-23 yrs, 2 mos	13 yrs, 3 mos	13 years	8 years

Table 6. Survey question 2 results.

Question number three asked for total time in MOS. The average time in MOS was seven years, three months. The range of time in MOS was from one year to 19 years. Three respondents had less than two years in MOS and were still in their two year probationary period. Question 3 data:

Range	Mean	Median	Mode
1 year -19 years	7 years	6 years	2 years

Table 7. Survey question 3 results

Question 4 asked if they had deployed as a 3044 not with a MEU. Deployed time included permanent change of station (PCS) tours to Okinawa, Japan of either one or three years. Twenty-eight had deployed as a 3044. Of the 19 who had not yet deployed as a 3044, twelve had fewer than four and one half years time in the MOS and only five had time in MOS greater than the mean in the below chart. The 3044 with the longest time in the MOS of all respondents had never spent any time deployed. The data below are for time in MOS for only those Marines who hadn't deployed:

Range	Mean	Median	Mode
1 year -19 years	5 yrs, 9 mos	3 years	2 years

Table 8. Survey results for Non-deployed 3044s time in MOS

Question 5 asked for deployments and the lengths of the deployments. Twenty-eight respondents had deployed for a total of 368 months (including time deployed with MEUs). Forty-four percent of the deployed time was either in the Balkans or PCS to

Okinawa: 63 months in the Balkans and 99 months in Okinawa. Another 54 months was deployed with MEUs. The deployed time consisted of 69 deployments, 44 of which involved operations/exercises other than deployments to Okinawa, the Balkans, and with a MEU. Therefore 63.8% of the deployments accounted for 41% of the deployed time. The average length of these deployments was 3.5 months. The following chart shows the mean deployed time for only those 3044s who had deployed, and the mean for all respondents:

Range	Mean those deployed	Mean for all respondents
2 months – 36 months	13.6 months	8 months

Table 9. Survey results 3044 deployed time

Therefore with an average time in MOS for all respondents of seven years, only an average of 8 months was spent deployed. However, the first two years of the MOS is spent in a probationary period when they do not deploy, so it is an average 8 months deployed out of five years when they are eligible for deployment. This means that the MOS is deployed approximately 13% of the time (8 out of 60 months). The typical service member today spends close to 20 percent of his time deployed. (Ref. 20) The average for the MOS is less than all service members during their time in the MOS. Of the 28 with deployed time, 5 were above the service average of 20%. The Marine Corps has started tracking these deployed days and 1 March 2001 started placing it on the Leave and Earnings Statement (LES). (Ref. 21)

The Congress was concerned about the frequency of deployments during the deliberations on the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act. As part of that legislation they provided that service members be paid \$100 per day for each day deployed in excess of 400 in a two-year period. (Ref. 21) The effective date of the Act is

1 October 2000, so no service members are eligible yet. Although the data cannot be broken down by two-year period, only six of the 28 with deployed time had spent over 400 days deployed in their MOS.

Question six asked if the chance to deploy was a major consideration in moving to the 3044 MOS. Thirty-four or 72 % of the 47 respondents replied no.

Question seven asked if the respondents felt they deployed too often, just enough, or not enough. Six of the respondents did not answer this question, the only question open to all 3044s that was not answered by all respondents. 12 of the respondents did not believe 3044s deployed enough, while 23 felt they deployed just enough.




Figure 6. Survey question 7 results.

It would appear from unsolicited comments later in the survey in which two respondents felt the need to comment on this closed ended question, that the problem

may not lie in frequency of deployments, but who deploys. Ms. Shari Durand, the Director of Contracts at Headquarters Marine Corps, also echoed this concern in a personal interview. (Ref. 10) The quotes from the survey are as follows:

I don't think 44s (3044s) as a whole deploy too much, I think the manning of the FSSGs is where we are going wrong. In my opinion the FSSGs are manned with Marines who come from another FSSG, and Base Marines go to Base. Also, it seems the monitor and MOS liaison officer rely on volunteers to man the FSSGs. So to rewrite your question, Do 44s in the FSSGs deploy too much? No.

Question 7 is a "loaded" question because if the 3044 Marine is stationed with a base unit he/she experiences little or no deployment time. Conversely, a Marine stationed with the FSSG in support of a MEU, that Marine is deployed too often. My recommendation is to convert all of the Marines to base units. Have the "base" Marines be in support of their designated region. By creating a larger pool of Marines for deployment would balance out each Marine's deployment time regardless of the base or FSSG designation.

The Marines who deploy come out of the FSSG, while the base Marines do not deploy. Without a tracking system a Marine can go from base billet to base billet without ever deploying.

The demographics of the six 3044s who answered question seven that they believed that 3044s deployed too often are as follows:

Time in MOS	Time deployed
8 yrs, 9 mos	11 months
7 yrs, 10 mos	12 months
6 yrs, 9 mos	6 mos
6 yrs, 9 mos	12 mos
3 yrs, 9 mos	0 mos
11 yrs, 10 mos	2 mos

Table 10. Demographics of 3044s who thought 3044s deployed too often

Questions eight through 16 were answered only by the six 3044s who had deployed with a MEU. Question eight asked how many MEU deployments they had done. Three did two deployments and the other three respondents did two deployments. Question 9 asked the dollar value of the warrant they deployed with. All responded up to the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) (one had deployed when the SAT was \$25,000). Question 10 asked if they had to write any contracts while deployed that were greater than the SAT. None had. Two replied that they had commitments greater than the SAT they were able to make delivery orders against the MLS contract to satisfy the commitments. Question 11 asked if any other MEU personnel had a contracting warrant. No respondent deployed with another warranted contractor, only with ordering officers. Question 12 asked if the ARG split while they deployed, only two responded yes. Question 13 asked how the 3044 felt about his workload as a MEU contract specialist. Two-thirds believed it to be at least moderately challenging:

Among the most challenging assignments I have had in the Marine Corps	1
Moderately Challenging	3
Constantly looking for things to occupy time	1
Talents were completely wasted	1

Table 11. Survey results to question 13.

Question 14 asked the respondents opinion of going back out on deployment with a MEU. The results below show that at least two-thirds would not take a negative view of going on another deployment with a MEU:

Would seek out an opportunity	1
Happy with some reservations	2
No strong feeling, just another billet	1
Would rather not	2

Table 12. Survey results to question 14

Question 15 asked whether they would recommend a tour with a MEU to their fellow 3044s. The data below show that 5 out of 6 would recommend a tour to a fellow 3044. Again this shows a generally positive feeling of deploying with a MEU:

Would highly encourage	2
Would encourage it	3
Would not encourage it	1

Table 13. Survey results for question 15

Whereas the last three questions showed an overall positive experience from working on the MEU, question 16 asked the 3044 any difficulties they encountered while contracting during their tours with MEUs. These comments fell into three categories. The first category dealt with the requirements of the billet. The first three comments below followed a theme of being underutilized as a “glorified credit card holder” and losing knowledge in their MOS performing non-contracting duties. The following are responses received concerning the work requirements:

I feel that assigning a 3044 to the East Coast MEUs is a waste of a billet. This Marine cannot exercise his contracting authority unless he is deployed out of the Camp LeJeune area. So, for most of his assignment, he is used as nothing more than a glorified credit card holder. Most of his deployment time is used placing delivery orders against an established Navy IDIQ contract. These actions can be supported by additional GCPC holders and Ordering Officers. If true contracting support is required, a 3044 can always be augmented to the MEU In the same manner that critical billets are augmented. (An East Coast 3044 assigned to a MEU is normally assigned for 2 years, 6-8 months work-up, 6 month deployment, 6-8 month work-up and 6 month deployment.)

Many times you see yourself doing jobs outside of your MOS. Believe me there is nothing wrong with that, but when you are away for six months losing knowledge and understanding of the changes that have taken place in Acquisitions during that time frame. It hurts when you are trying to fall back into the place of knowledge that you had before that time frame.

While the Acquisition field going paperless and doing a lot of purchasing through the internet, the need of a 3044 at a MEU is a not required. Especially if there is a Contingency they will send a 3044 out there to support. There seems to be a waste of our knowledge when it comes down to the MEUs.

The second category of comments related to their relationship to the command staff. Generally, the comments reflected that the MEU staff did not properly consult the 3044 in planning, did not rely on their knowledge, or didn't exactly understand what they needed to perform their mission. The following were such comments:

For a 3044 to be effective in a MEU billet his billet has to be respected, and he has to be respected as the duty expert in his MOS. I found that dealing with the MEU staff, there was always someone trying to speak for the contractor to answer contracting issues without having the knowledge, experience or authority to make those decisions. The S4, S4A, and SUPO were often the offenders. Unauthorized commitments was another issue which could have been avoided if contracting support had been requested. Another case of the MEU staff not understanding the 3044 capabilities or not seeking them out.

Getting the command to understand that the contract specialist must have freedom to work independently of the command. Most commands want to keep control of the individual to the point where he or she must always give an account of their whereabouts at all times.

There could have been better planning for commodities on their behalf. I would recommend giving just a brief introduction of the contracting process to the staff (e.g. S3, S4, G3, G4) of any deployable unit. Regardless of rank, contracting specialists should get to attend any conferences that apply to the planning stages for any type of exercise. It would in turn make things run smoother in future exercise.

The third category of comments related to the short fused nature of requests:

Fulfilling last minute requirements due to poor planning, and not having a detailed description of the service or supply required. This often led to wasted funds and time.”

The only difficulty that I came upon was trying to obtain very important items at the last minute. As always trying to obtain US items in Europe is not always easy. The job itself was easy if you put your mind towards what had to be done.

The most difficult was the ‘gotta have it yesterday no matter what’ attitude. This starts with Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) and then lasts until return to CONUS. The MEU does not understand contracting rules. This can make things very difficult.

A few of the above comments also were related to the urgency of need for all requirements. There is great pressure on the contracting officer to get things on a short notice. This can lead to pressures to circumvent the system or take short cuts. Although none expressed this problem, it can be a source of tension when your boss is the one bringing the requirements to you. In this environment there is no independence of the contracting officer.

C. OVERVIEW OF SURVEY DATA

The researcher believes that two primary conclusions can be drawn from the data collected from the survey. The first conclusion is that overall the deployment rate for the MOS is not excessive. There may be a problem with the distribution of who deploys as discussed earlier. The second conclusion is that although the 3044s who had deployed with a MEU generally viewed their deployment(s) with a MEU as positive experiences, they felt their talents were underutilized. They felt that the time deployed was not the best use of their skills.

D. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

There are four sources of internal contracting support available to the MEU Commander for deployments. The first source is to deploy with an enlisted contract specialist. Second, the MEU SupO can receive a warrant up to the SAT. Third, MEU personnel can be appointed ordering officers against government contracts. Lastly, the GCPC credit card limit can be raised to \$25,000. If the commander can arrange for the training of his personnel prior to deployment, he can deploy with all four capabilities. This discussion will address each of these alternatives separately.

1. Enlisted Contract Specialists

Having a 3044 on the MEU staff provides optimal flexibility to the MEU commander. It is an asset he knows he will have when he leaves on a deployment in which his itinerary is uncertain. Even though a few of the respondents to the survey addressed being included in planning as a deficiency, in the case of contingency operation, the 3044 is available for planning immediately upon receipt of the warning order. Additionally he will have familiarity with the unit he will be supporting. He understands the command, its missions, equipment, and may be able to detect gaps in support requests.

There is a definite contrast to the overall feeling about the necessity of 3044s from the point of view of the 3044 and the MEU SupO. Each of the east coast MEU SupOs interviewed felt strongly about the need to deploy with a 3044. On the other hand, the general feeling from the 3044s is that although the experience is worthwhile, they felt underutilized, as in the words of one 3044: “a glorified credit card holder”. The environment that the east coast deploys in is the most developed of the MEUs and has

established contracts that meet near all requirements. This is far different from the environments faced by deployments from the west coast, which does not have anything like a one stop shopping instrument like the MLS contract.

A concern expressed by MgySgt Brown, the head of enlisted contracting headquarters Marine Corps, was that 3044s were not being returned to the FSSG upon conclusion of the deployment. He expressed the need for these Marines to get back to the FSSG so that they can resume their contracting training. They join the MEU at E-180 for pre-deployment workups and normally stay through two deployments. They support the MEU during the pre-deployment exercises much like the Camp Pendleton base contracting office supports the west coast MEUs during the same training. During the six-month post deployment period, there is little contracting work required for a command element that shrinks in size to less than 30 depending on rotations of personnel. He believed that this time was better spent working in the FSSG contingency contracting office. (Ref. 12)

When not deployed, the 3044s work for the FSSG contingency contracting officer (CCO). The two CONUS based CCOs both expressed difficulties in getting deployed time for their Marines in support of exercises/operations. The 3rd FSSG CCO in Okinawa expressed no such concern since his Marines routinely function in a deployed environment. In fact he mentioned an interest in decreasing deployed days. (Ref. 22) The current 1st FSSG CCO, who does not provide a 3044 to the MEUs at this time was receptive to providing 3044s to the MEUs on a limited basis:

E-180 (beginning of pre-deployment workups) is too far out. 3044 is a low density MOS, and should be treated similarly to disbursing and other last minute joins to the MEU. E-90 is better, but even then, only on a less than full time basis. Having a 3044 assigned to each MEU would render the CCO incapable of handling its other missions (Ref. 11)

Major Begin further addressed other benefits of expanding the Marines experiences as a Marine. He thought it would be good for an “office pogue” (derogatory term for Marine who works in the office, vice one that spends a lot of time in the field) to experience the challenges of ship life. The previous 1st FSSG CCO had a much stronger feeling against the deployment of 3044s with west coast MEUs:

This would be an exercise in futility. A 3044 is a wasted talent on a six-month deployment supporting a MEU. Eighty percent of the contracting actions would be in the form of credit card purchases. The remaining contracting actions that exceed the micro-purchase level will be handled by a theater contracting command. (Ref. 23: p 3)

When asked if they thought they would be able to fully employ a 3044, each of the west coast MEU SupOs said no. Since half of the deployment is spent in transit to and from the AOR, the 3044 would have large stretches where he would be looking for things to do to keep him busy. The theme was that proper advanced planning during pre-deployment planning conferences decreased the likelihood of difficulties experienced during deployment. The preferred method of support currently provided is to have a contracting officer from the NRCC at the exercise/operation site. When asked which they preferred: deploy with a 3044, the current method of support, or the SupO receive a warrant, the unanimous answer was for the MEU SupO to receive a warrant. The researcher believes that this is because it gives them maximum control of their success.

This is evident in the quote from Capt Tucker, the only MEU SupO interviewed who had deployed with a warrant, in the following section.

Another issue brought up by the SupOs was the need for the 3044 to attend the pre-deployment planning conferences and to be a member of the exercise advanced party. The conferences cost anywhere from \$5,000-\$10,000 per attendee depending on the countries traveled to. Until fiscal year 2000, these costs were charged to higher headquarters as Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) funds. They are now funded by the MEU.

2. Warrant the MEU SupO up to SAT

Either in addition, or instead of deploying with a 3044, the MEU SupO can receive a warrant to support the MEU. He would bring the same capabilities as the 3044, which would mean that he could procure almost all requirements of the MEU. The minimum training requirement for a Marine to receive a warrant under the SAT is the same as for an ordering officer appointment. MCO P4200.15G describes these requirements and who can issue the warrant:

1. ... Appointment of contracting officers below the small purchase threshold for the activities listed in paragraph 2003 (FSSG CCO) shall be in writing, by name, and issued by the chief of the regional contracting office designated to support such activities. Appointments as contracting officer will be done via a contracting officer Certificate of Appointment (SF 1402), which will specify the level of purchasing authority authorized. Copies of all contracting officers warrants issued shall be maintained in the permanent file of the activity and will be retained for a period of not less than 5 years after each contracting officer ceases to serve.

2. Authority of contracting officers appointed by the chief of a regional contracting office will be limited to small purchase open-market authority not to exceed the small purchase threshold and delivery order authority up to the maximum order limitation. These warrants will specify that they are only valid for the activity to which attached. These contracting officers shall be under the direction of the chief contracting office making the appointment.

3. Prior to appointment of contracting officers, the individual shall, as a minimum, have completed the Purchasing Fundamentals Course (Pur 101) (formerly Defense Small Purchase Course). (Ref. 6: para. 2101)

The 31st MEU is the only MEU to deploy with a warranted Supply Officer. The warrant was provided by the Regional Contracting Officer (RCO) at Camp Butler, Okinawa and contingent upon the stipulation that the SupO would only use it when there was no other contracting officer at the exercise/operation site. Capt Tucker, the first Supply Officer to deploy with a contracting warrant up to the SAT loved the flexibility it provided him. He used it during two separate deployments in Korea and Australia. He preferred it to the NRCC:

It provided me huge flexibility. I didn't like the bureaucracy of the NRCC...Contracting people like to say no. When I go through the NRCC I lose the authority and independence. If you are going to be the one responsible, why can't you have the authority? (Ref. 24)

He felt that any supply officer should be able to handle the responsibilities. A person with good organizational skills would be able to handle it easily. He depended on his fiscal and supply chiefs for assistance in administering contracts and ensuring delivery when he was not available. He did not experience split ARG ops during either of his deployments.

As addressed in Chapter III, the MLS contract is a requirements contract for both the Navy and the Marine Corps, which in effect ties the east coast MEUs to that contract.

The 31st MEU SupO was not tied to requirements contracts with a husbanding contractor. Husbanding contracts in that AOR do not bind the Marine Corps specifically. This can have two effects. First he can compete for lower prices as Captain Tucker mentioned paying as little as ¼ what the Navy paid in Townsville, Australia. Second, it means more work by the SupOs to perform market research to locate competition. With urgent items, as most tend to be with the MEU; it seems probable that market research and competition was limited. He experienced no contracts near \$100,000 with only two above \$25,000, which was the limit of his purchase card.

There are concerns with using a MEU SupO as a warranted contracting officer. He is closely involved with the unit and will like the 3044 be pressed to circumvent the regulations or cut corners to provide support on a short notice. It will require discipline on the part of the SupO to do the right thing. The one advantage the 3044 has over the SupO in this regard is that his additional training will have imbedded the correct purchasing procedures into his actions more strongly. The 3044 will have had at least two years of base contracting work compared to a couple weeks of class time for the SupO. A counter to this pressure to cut corners due to time constraints is that the MEU SupO also holds the purse strings. He has an incentive to get competition to seek out the best price because he has to be especially wary of the bottom-line. Marine Corps SupOs are notorious for being frugal and good at economizing.

A previous NPS thesis student proposed that Contracting Officers be placed on the staffs of the Marine Expeditionary Units. (Ref. 25: p. 106) Although it was not the purpose of his thesis to explore the workload that these billets would accord a contracting officer, it is obvious that if 3044s feel they are underutilized during deployments, then an

education at NPS would be a great waste in these billets. However, these billets could be used to incorporate current Supply Officers into the contracting field. In addition to the NAVSUP training course, when their pre-deployment schedule allows, MEU SupOs could attend Defense Acquisition University (DAU) classes to enhance their knowledge. DAU courses such as CON 234, Contingency Contracting would provide additional knowledge in challenging situations. Those SupOs who show an aptitude and preference could be singled out for additional training and follow on assignments in contracting as required. This would give the Marine Corps a separate pipeline for Contracting Officers outside the NPS pipeline and the 18-month time investment that comes with it.

3. Ordering Officer Capability

The west coast MEUs do not take advantage of the training required for this ability; however still perform the duties with the husbanding contractors. All other MEUs take advantage of the training. As nearly all contracting is provided through the use of the MLS husbanding services requirements contract, this ability is vital to the success of the east coast MEU deployments. One of the MEUs provided the training to three additional personnel to assist the MEU SupO and 3044 in case the MEU operates in multiple locations. As shown in paragraph 2.a.4 of Appendix B, the appointing order for a for an east coast MEU SupO as an ordering officer, they can only make orders against husbanding contracts written and administered by the NRCC Naples, Italy or the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Norfolk, Virginia. Access to Army Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) or other such contracts in theater would have to be accessed through the appropriate joint command, as currently required with a 3044. Although the most recent MEU SupOs have deployed with ordering limits of \$25,000 there is nothing

in the NAVSUPINST 4200.85 or MCO P4200.15G that precludes them from receiving authority up to the SAT.

4. Government-wide Commercial Purchase Card

As a warranted contracting officer, the 3044 that deploys with the MEUs possesses a credit card with the same limit as his warrant, up to the SAT or \$100,000. This provides maximum flexibility to use this card as a contracting instrument and not just as a method of payment. 31st MEU deploys with a limit of \$25,000 and the west coast MEUs limit is \$2,500. These cards can be valuable purchase instruments in developed countries like those that host most of the deployment exercises. This researcher had problems getting vendors in Mombasa, Kenya willing to take the GCPC in 1999. Cash is the preferred method of payment in these countries.

The GCPC is especially undependable in contingency operations. Other than our contingency responses to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, underdeveloped, third world countries are the most likely places we will deploy for contingency operations. As after action reports for exercise Operation Restore Hope demonstrate, use of the GCPC will not normally be a factor inside the country where the contingency is taking place. Inside these the countries the infrastructure will normally be so diminished that credit cards will not be accepted for payment. In these cases, supplies may be purchased and transported in from another country.

E. CHAPTER SUMMARY

The MEU contracting requirements can be procured, with few exceptions under the simplified acquisition threshold. The use of a contracting warrant up to the simplified acquisition threshold by either a MEU SupO or a 3044 will give the MEU most of the

capabilities it needs. Only on those rare occasions that it has a procurement greater than \$100,000 will it need assistance from a contracting officer from the NRCC. Because of the capabilities of the MLS contract, the east coast MEUs are in a particular enviable contracting environment. There is rarely a need to write any contracts. An ordering officer can accomplish most of their procurements with a limit up to the limit of the contract. This is a big reason why 3044s who have supported MEU deployments in the past tend to feel that their talents are being underutilized during these deployments. The GCPC can also be a valuable purchasing tool in developed countries, especially if the MEU takes advantage of the training available to receive a \$25,000 single purchase limit.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This study has explained the differences between the areas of responsibility for each of the MEUs, likely missions, and how each of the MEFs have supported MEUs while deployed. The researcher has also explained the capabilities of the available support methods. Additionally, the survey of enlisted contract specialists has demonstrated that as a whole the MOS is not excessively deployed and the addition of deployments in support of the west coast MEUs would not overtax the MOS. In fact the CONUS CCOs are concerned with getting enough deployed time for their Marines. This chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for the support of deployed MEUs. It also answers the research questions that were introduced in Chapter I and recommends areas for further research.

B. CONCLUSIONS

The data collected from the survey and the material presented throughout this study have enabled the researcher to reach the following conclusions:

1. The operations tempo of the 3044s can support CONUS based MEU deployments. Both CCOs expressed an interest in keeping their Marines employed in overseas exercises. The training of contracting in an overseas environment cannot be simulated anywhere else other than to get the Marines involved in these exercises. The results of the survey clearly show that the addition of the west coast MEUs to the deployment cycle would not overly stress these Marines.

2. MEU SupOs are capable of performing the duties as contracting officer while deployed, but they should be restricted to use experienced contracting personnel when

available. Although they are personally involved with the unit generating the requirements, they also have a great incentive to perform in the best interests of the Government because they also perform duties as the budgeting officer. These officers generally have rudimentary knowledge of the acquisition of the acquisition system from their involvement on the support side with base contracting offices.

3. West coast MEU SupOs are not receiving the proper training to assume duties as ordering officers while deployed or taking advantage of the ability to increase their GCPC single purchase limit to \$25,000. Even though they have been placing orders with and being supported by husbanding contractors, none of the west coast MEU SupOs received the requisite training.

4. Because of the differences in external contracting asset available in each of the MEUs AORs, it is not preferable to standardize internal support for all seven MEUs. However, the support provided can be enhanced. Because of the heavy deployment cycles of 3rd FSSG 3044s, it is not practical to recommend that 31st MEU deploy with a 3044. It is practical to recommend that the MEU SupO continue to deploy with a contracting warrant because of the frequency with which they conduct joint exercises and have other contracting support assets to go to for assistance and the low dollar total of contracting required. The east coast MEUs, however need a 3044 least of all even though they are the only ones that deploy with one. The current MLS contract provides far superior contracting support as compared to the AORs for the west coast and 31st MEUs. However since the deployment schedule is much busier than the west coast MEUs, the 3044 provides added flexibility to the MEU SupO with an extra asset for split ARGs. West coast MEUs are heavily dependent on the NRCC to provide a contracting officer

for their exercises and a contracting capability would greatly enhance the MEUs capabilities.

C. RECOMMENDATIONS

From analyzing the data collected and the material presented throughout this study, the researcher makes the following recommendations:

1. The 1st FSSG CCO should provide an enlisted contract specialist in support of the west coast MEU exercises. At E-180 he should make the 3044 available to the MEU to attend planning conferences in the exercise AOR and in direct support to contract MEU pre-deployments. This would start to build the supporting relationship prior to deployment. Since the first month and a half is generally transit time with sustainment training that is directly supported by base contracting offices in Hawaii and Singapore, the 3044 would fly in to meet the advance party in support of the operation. This is no different from what they experience with a NRCC rep that provides support. They would stay with the MEU to contract their requirements until the MEU starts its departure from the AOR for their home base. During the entire deployment period the 3044 would have to be available to leave within 12 hours notice to join the MEU to support a contingency operation. Again, this is not very different from current contingency support plans; a contracting officer would be called to fly to site of the operation.. This maximizes training time for the 3044 in his MOS and also improves support to the MEU because they have a dedicated contracting officer that they have experience working with and is familiar with the needs of the unit.

2. The 3044s should provide assistance on the same basis as stated above for the west coast during pre-deployment and return within 30 days after deployment. However

they join the MEU just prior to deployment and conduct the entire deployment with the MEU. Since these MEUs are more likely to do split operations, it provides the MEU Commander greater flexibility to have the 3044 throughout the deployment. Because of the shorter transit time, there is less time between exercises. It is important that the 3044 return to the FSSG CCO within 30 days of the end of deployment so that the CCO can monitor his MOS training.

3. All three FSSG CCOs work with the MEU SupOs to arrange the training necessary for the MEU SupO to receive a contracting warrant up to the SAT. The MEU SupO can deploy with a warrant up to the SAT with the proper training to provide maximum flexibility to the MEU. It would be up to the discretion of the FSSG CCO to determine whether the SupO has the requisite knowledge to use this warrant. MEU SupOs normally do two deployments. Arranging additional training during the year between deployments can enhance the skills that are learned for one deployment. At the conclusion of the three years with the MEU, the Marine Corps would benefit from having additional trained deployed contracting personnel. These officers could then be available to fill other Marine Corps contracting positions. In the short run, the MEU SupO would deploy with an enlisted contract specialist in direct support of his exercises and contingencies. As the CCOs get more valuable training opportunities in joint environments and the deployment cycles cannot be met, the MEU SupO would deploy as the sole internal contracting option. The local NRCC will continue to be available for assistance as required.

4. FSSG CCOs should continue to press the need for 3044s to get billets in joint overseas exercises with their respective MEF and MARFOR headquarters. Deployments

with east coast MEUs are not the best alternative for overseas contracting experience. The routine nature of making orders against existing contracts and GCPC purchases can be accomplished by most competent non-contracting personnel, that is why NAVSUP provides four day classes for these individuals. The challenging assignments are with deployments in support of joint exercises and contingency operations overseas. Contingency operations are conducted in a joint environment and our 3044s need the experiences of working alongside Army and Air Force contingency contractors to gain from their experiences. We must get our 3044s more experience in these exercises so that we can justify their inclusion in contracting cells for contingencies when they occur.

D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This study sought to answer six secondary research questions presented in Chapter I in order to find a complete answer to the primary research question of: What is the United States Marine Corps' experience with contract support of deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and how might this information be used to enhance the support to deployed units? All of the data, analyses, conclusions, and recommendations throughout this study have answered these questions.

The first of the secondary research questions was: What are the current USMC policies with respect to contract support and how does the USMC typically provide support to deployed MEUs? This study has demonstrated that it is the Marine Corps' policy to allow each of the MEFs to decide how best to support their MEUs. Further, in chapter III, the researcher demonstrated the capabilities of the typical support methods that are employed by the MEUs from each MEF.

The second question was: What are the various types of contract support required by deployed MEUs? Chapter II contained an evaluation of each of the types of

contracting support required by the MEUs II during the discussion of the typical MEU deployments. Generally these requirements fall under the SAT and consist of transportation of personnel and assets, cell phones, portable toilets, garbage disposal, and other camp support type items.

The third question was: What are the current issues associated with the support methodologies chosen by the Marine Corps? The major issues of increased use of 3044s in support of MEU deployments are whether the deployment tempo of the 3044s can support these additional deployments and whether it is a best use of these personnel. The researcher believes that he has demonstrated that the deployment tempo could support the MEU, but that it is not necessarily the best use of the skills of an experienced 3044.

The fourth question was: Are the current methods of providing contract support adequate and responsive to deployed unit needs? The current methods are adequate to support the MEUs, but not in all cases the most responsive. Internal assets are more responsive because they have a personal stake in the success of the unit. The additional administrative requirements placed by outside commands to access support can greatly increase the lead-time, especially as personnel get accustomed to using a new system.

The fifth question was: Are alternative contract support methods available to deployed units? If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with various contract support methodologies? Alternative contract support methods were addressed in Chapter III. Advantages and disadvantages were discussed for each method.

The final secondary research question was: How might the USMC alter current practices to enhance the level of support provided to deployed MEUs? The recommendations above provide five improvements that enhance overall support of the

MEUs when deployed and better utilize Marine Corps personnel in support roles. These recommendations will give the MEU commander more flexibility and will also benefit the Marine Corps by providing both its Supply Officers and 3044s more experience.

E. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This researcher recommends five areas for further research as a result of efforts to complete this study:

1. Should we use the degree completion program to meet DAWIA requirements for 3044s? To get our enlisted Marines up to the educational standards of DAWIA there are degree completion programs available, however the pay back tour for these Marines has not been in contracting billets. Research could be conducted in how many slots per year would be required for this program and what payback billets would be appropriate.

2. Base vs. FSSG Marines. As brought out in the survey responses, there is a bias in who gets deployed and who doesn't. Research would be needed to provide the best use of Marines in garrison. At each of the major stations, Camp Pendleton, Camp LeJeune, and Okinawa Marines either serve with base contracting office or the FSSG. The FSSG billets are deployable billets, while the base billets do not normally deploy. Recommendations would be required for the best use of these Marines and a more fair spread of deployed time for the Marines.

3. Could we use supply school to provide contracting courses to SupOs and 3044s? Research could be conducted in the feasibility of contracting courses being provided at supply school for introductory contracting classes for MEU.

4. Is our force structure for 3044s adequate? Research can be conducted as to whether we have too many 3044s, not enough, or whether we need them at all. If we are

having trouble getting our 3044s deployed time then maybe we have too many. Do we need them in billets that we are not currently utilizing them? Or should we leave the contingency contracting mission to the Army and the Air Force and depend on the NRCC for husbanding contracts as the Navy does?

5. Could we use the Supply Officer MOS of 3002 as a feeder MOS for Marine Corps contracting officers? The Marine Corps recognizes the extension of the supply field to contracting by using the enlisted Supply MOS exclusively to feed into the enlisted contracting field. However the Corps accepts any officer MOS into the contracting MOS 9656. Extending the supply MOS into contracting would eliminate the need of requiring officers outside their MOS, losing MOS credibility and then returning to their original MOS behind their peers.

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APPENDIX A

Marine Corps Enlisted Contracting Specialist Billets (Source: Headquarters Marine Corps Contracts Division)

TONUM	ORG DESC	BILLET DESC	RANK
3			
321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321F	SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321G	SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SSGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3321S	SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN	PROCUREMENT MAN	SGT
3512F	HQSVCCO 1ST TRANS SPTBN	PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK	SGT
3512S	HQSVCCO 2ND TRANS SPTBN	PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK	SGT
4929N	H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
4929N	H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH	PURCHASING CLERK	SGT
4929N	H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH	PURCHASING CLERK	SGT
4957P	HQSVC CO MARFORLANT	PURCHASING CHIEF	GYSGT
4957P	HQSVC CO MARFORLANT	PURCHASING SPEC	SGT
4958	CHEM-BIO INCIDNT RES CELL	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	GYSGT
4961N	MARFOREUR	CONTRACTING CHIEF	SSGT
4962N	HQ MARFORSOUTH	CONTRACTING CHIEF	SSGT
5055A	MARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA	CONTRACT SPECIALIST	SSGT
5103	I&L DEPT HQMC ADMIN SPT	PROC CHIEF	MGYSGT
5103	I&L DEPT HQMC ADMIN SPT	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	SSGT
5114	AR DIV ADMIN SPT	CONTRACTING CHIEF	GYSGT
5114	AR DIV ADMIN SPT	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SSGT
5114	AR DIV ADMIN SPT	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
5133A	MCSA MISSA	HEAD CONTRACTING CHIEF	MSGT
5141	H-S CO MB 8TH-I WASH	PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN	GYSGT
5141	H-S CO MB 8TH-I WASH	PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN	SGT
5150	HQBN HQMC	PROC SUPPLY CLERK	SSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SUP CHIEF	MGYSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	GYSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	MSGT

7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	GYSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SSGT
7010A	MARCORLOGBASES	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
7010B	MC LOGISTIC BASE ALBANY	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
7010C	MCLB BARSTOW BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	MSGT
7010C	MCLB BARSTOW BASE OPS	PURCHASING/CONTRACT SPEC	SSGT
7211	MCRD SAN DIEGO BASE OPS	PURCH & CONTR SPEC	SSGT
7211	MCRD SAN DIEGO BASE OPS	PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC	SGT
7311A	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC	GYSGT
7311A	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	MSGT
7311A	MCRD PARRIS ISLAND	PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC	SGT
7411	MCCDC	PROCURE CHIEF	MSGT
7411	MCCDC	PROCUR SPEC	GYSGT
7411	MCCDC	PROCUR SPEC	SSGT
7411	MCCDC	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	SSGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR	MSGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	SGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR	GYSGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	PROC SUPPLY MAN	SGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	CONTRACT SPECIALIST	SGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	CONTRACT SURV REP	SGT
7511	MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	GYSGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	P & C SPECIALIST	GYSGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	P & C SPECIALIST	SGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	SSGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	P & C SPECIALIST	SGT
7611	MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
7671	MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRNG CTR	CONTRACT/PURCHASING SPEC	SSGT
7711	MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	GYSGT
7711	MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPEC	SGT
7711	MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPEC	SSGT
7711	MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS	BPA ADMINISTRATOR	SGT
7711	MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPEC	SGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	CONTRACTING CHIEF	MGYSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	CONTRACT SPEC	SSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	CONTRACT SPEC	GYSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	CONTRACT SPEC	SSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	SSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	SGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	CONTRACT SPEC	GYSGT
7803	MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	SGT
7900	RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	MSGT
7900	RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	GYSGT
7900	RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	SGT
8221A	MATSG PENSACOLA COMBINED	PURCHASING NCOIC	SSGT
8365	H&HS MCAS MIRAMAR	CONTRACT SPEC	MSGT
8365	H&HS MCAS MIRAMAR	CONTRACT SPEC	SSGT

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Contingency Contracting Office
2d Supply Battalion, 2d Force Service Support Group
U. S. Marine Forces, Atlantic
Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 28547-8368

4200
CCO
21 Sep 00

From: Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion, 2d Force
Service Support Group
To: Supply Officer, 22d MEU

Subj: APPOINTMENT OF ORDERING OFFICER

Ref: MCO 4200.15G

1. Appointment. In accordance with the reference you are hereby appointed an Ordering Officer for the purposes set forth in paragraph 2 herein. Your appointment shall become effective 1 November 2000 and remain effective unless sooner revoked or you are reassigned to other than the 22d MEU. You are under the technical supervision of the Contracting Officer, 22d MEU, for your actions as an ordering officer.

2. Authority, Limitations and Requirements. Your appointment is subject to the use of the method of purchase and to the limitations and requirements stated below:

a. Subject to your ensuring that funds are available and that local purchase authority exists for the transaction, you may make purchases of class I, II, III, IV, VI and IX using the DD1155, Order for Supplies and Services, using pre-established Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts provided all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The aggregate amount of a purchase transaction is not in excess of \$25,000. You shall not split purchases to avoid this monetary limitation.

(2) Supplies are immediately available from the vendor.

(3) One delivery and one payment shall be made.

(4) The IDTC contracts that delivery orders are placed against are awarded, administered and monitored by either the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), Naples, Italy or, the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Norfolk, Virginia and are established for the provision of Husbandry Agent type services. The use of any other IDTC contracts is prohibited.

b. You are responsible for:

(1) distributing and administering delivery orders that you place,

(2) establishing controls necessary to ensure that all contract terms and conditions are met and that supplies or non-personal services ordered conform to contract requirements before acceptance is made or payment is authorized, and

(3) reporting deficiencies in contractor performance promptly to the contracting officer who awarded the contract against which the delivery order was placed.

You may not make any changes in the terms or conditions of any contracts against which you place delivery orders. The authority stated above shall not be re-delegated to any other person.

3. Assignment of Procurement Instrument Identification Numbers (PIIN). The assignment of PIINs for use in placing the above referenced delivery orders shall be in accordance with those guidelines set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. In accordance with the aforementioned you will assign each delivery order a (13) digit procurement instrument identification number. This number will be assigned as follows:

- The first (6) digits will contain the UIC M68447
- The 7th and 8th digits will represent the current fiscal year (e.g. 00 for FY 2000)
- The 9th digit will be "D" thus citing the instrument as a "delivery order"
- The last (4) digits will be a serial number. Your block of serial numbers will begin with 2100 and continue through to 2199. These serial numbers will be

used sequentially and a new serial number will be used for each delivery order placed on a distinct IDTC. Serial numbers may remain the same for multiple delivery orders placed against the same Contract.

Commensurate with PIIN assignment you will also assign a five digit sequencing number to track individual delivery orders placed against the same contract. In this case the first three digits of this sequencing number will begin with MSY and use a block of serial numbers beginning with 01 and ending with 99. These numbers can be replicated as you issue new delivery orders on different contracts.

4. Standards of Conduct and Acquisition Reporting Requirements.

a. You shall comply with the standards as prescribed in DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation and shall review the regulation at least semiannually.

b. You shall furnish the Contracting Officer such information as may be required for acquisition reporting purposes in the manner and the time so specified.

5. Termination of Appointment.

a. Your appointment may be revoked at any time by the Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion, 2d FSSG and shall be terminated in writing except that no written termination of your appointment shall be made upon expiration or termination of contracts enumerated in paragraph 2.

b. Should you be reassigned from your present position or Should your employment be terminated while this appointment is in effect, you shall promptly notify the appointing authority in writing so that your appointment may be terminated.

c. Prior to departure from your current assignment, you shall report to this office for a review of your records for clearance.

6. Guidance. Having been given the Ordering Officer authority cited herein you have also received training and guidance, both verbally and in written form, to be used when placing any and all delivery orders. If at any time during your use of your authority you find that you are unsure of

the proper procedures to be used or of the limitations of your authority you shall immediately seek guidance. This guidance can be sought by contacting the Contracting Officer of either the 22d MEU or cognizant Contracting Officers within the 2d FSSG Contracting Office. Where doubts linger, it is in your best interest to Preclude committing actions that you are unsure of until proper guidance has been provided.

6. All matters of question regarding this appointment Should be addressed to the Contracting Officer, 2d FSSG at 910-451-0776 or DSN 751-0776.

Signed
Contracting Officer

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit
Special Operations Capable
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 28542

4200
S4
8 Nov 00

From: Supply Officer, 22d MEU
To: Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion
Subj: ORDERING OFFICER APPOINTMENT

1. I, name of supply officer, certify I have been briefed and understand my duties and responsibilities as an ordering officer for the 22d MEU. I have read and understand DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation.

2. I will place loyalty to country, ethical principles, and law above private gain and other interests and perform my duties in keeping with the highest tradition of the military service and civilian service to the U. S. Government.

3. I will avoid engaging in any personal business or professional activity or have or retain any direct or indirect financial interest which places me in a position in which there is a conflict or the appearance of a conflict between my private interests and the public interest of the United States as it relates to my duties and responsibilities as Department of Defense government personnel.

4. I will accept no gifts or gratuities from those who have or seek business with the DoD or from those business interests are affected by DoD functions.

Signed,
Supply Officer, 22d MEU

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APPENDIX C

Mediterranean Fleet Husbanding Contractor' s List				
Country	Med Ports	Agent	Port E-mail	Agent Mobile Phone
MLS HQ	CDO, CEO, QMB	Mendoza, Ricardo Rafaraci, Thomas Rafaraci, Frank	cdo@mls.com.mt	+39-335-848-5301 +39-335-848-5302 +39-335-848-5303
ALBANIA	DURRES, SHENGJIN	Hyqmet, Hima	durres@mls.com.mt	+355-3820-21487
ALGERIA	ALGIERS	Al Awwa, Abdel Awwa, Khaled Abdel Rahman	algiers@mls.com.mt	+20-12-213-3985 +20-12-213-6018
AZORES	PONTA DELGADA, HORTA	Benevides, Armando Rieff, Johannes William		+351-91-9153416 +351-91-9772814 +34-619-219937
CANARY ISLANDS	LAS PALMAS, TENERIFE	Delgado Rodriguez, Jacinto Gonzales Segura, Jose Lopez Aguilar, Ferico Morera Diepa, Santiago Pueyo Izquierdo, Francisco	laspalmas@mls.com.mt tenerife@mls.com.mt	
CROATIA	DUBROVNIK, PLOCE, RIJECKA, SPLIT	Palmiero Giuseppe Mauro Palmiero, Davide	dubrovnic@mls.com.mt ploce@mls.com.mt rijeka@mls.com.mt split@mls.com.mt	+39 -0335-223312 +33-609786858 +39-335-383539
CYPRUS	LARNACA, LIMASSOL	Solomonides, Gergios Solomonids, Takis	larnaca@mls.com.mt limassol@mls.com.mt	+357-09-442-643 +367-09-665-600
EGYPT	ALEXANDRIA, PORT SAID	Awwa, Abdel Awwa, Khaled Abdel Rahman	alexandria@mls.com.mt	+20-12-213-3985 +20-12-213-6018
FRANCE	ALL PORTS	Jacquelin, Stephanie Le Guay, Corinne Palmiero, Anna Palmiero, Mauro	ajacco@mls.com.mt	+33-6-097-86864 +33-6-097-86859 +39-0335-383539 +39-0335-223312
GIBRALTAR	GIBRALTAR	Mr. Tom Piner	tom.piner@gibnynex.gi	+350-0-77814 + 0-58 247 000

GREECE	ALL PORTS	Tzanakos, George	athens@mls.com.mt	+30-944-308-020
		Tzanakos, Maria	corfu@mls.com.mt	+30-944-332-398
ISRAEL	ASHDOD, EILAT, HAIFA	Meir, Samuelli Sassower, Gadi Varsano, Sam	ashdod@mls.com.mt	+972-58-315-224 +972-58-315-222 +972-58-315-223
ITALY	ANCONA	Bruschi, Antonio	ancona@mls.com.mt	+39-0348-334-4569
ITALY	ANZIO	Palmiero, Anna	anzio@mls.com.mt	+39-0335-679-7060
ITALY	AUGUSTA BAY, CATANIA, MESSINA, PALERMO, SIRACUSA, TAORMINA	Gaudiano, Gaetano	augusta@mls.com.mt	+39-335-848-5304
		Rafaraci, Frank	catania@mls.com.mt	+39-335-848-5303
		Rafaraci, Thomas		+39-335-848-5302
ITALY	BARI	Di Benedetto, Antonio Di Benedetto, Vittorio	bari@mls.com.mt	+39-339-263-2006
ITALY	BRINDISI, TARANTO	Danese Paolo	brindisi@mls.com.mt	+39-(0)347-720-4556
			taranto@mls.com.mt	
ITALY	CAGLIARI, LA MADDALENA	Mocci Antonio	cagliari@mls.com.mt	+39-(0)335-811-2699
		Pons Michele		+39-(0)335-811-2703
ITALY	CIVITAVECCHIA, GENOVA, LIVORNO	Palmiero, Davide Palmiero, Mauro	civitavecchia@mls.com.mt	+39-(0)335-383-539 +39-(0)335-223-312
ITALY	CROTONE	Di Benedetto Antonio	crotone@mls.com.mt	+39-339-263-2006
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ITALY	GIARDINI NAXOS	Rafaraci Frank		+39-0335-848-5303
ITALY	LA SPEZIA	Pensa Euro Giorgio	laspezia@mls.com.mt	+39-0348-767-6725
ITALY	NAPLES	Fariello Massimo	naples@mls.com.mt	+39-0335-699-8484
ITALY	PORTO EMPEDOCLE	Palmiero Giuseppe Mauro		+39 -0335-223312/033-609786858
ITALY	RIPOSTO	Rafaraci Frank	riposto@mls.com.mt	+39-0335-848-5303
ITALY	SALERNO	Fariello Massimo	salerno@mls.com.mt	+39-335-699-8484
ITALY	TRIESTE	Lonzar, Giampaolo Lonzar, Riccardo	trieste@mls.com.mt	+39-335-810-5300/335-256-001 +39-335-256-001
ITALY	VENICE		venice@mls.com.mt	
MALTA	MALTA			
MONACO	MONTE CARLO	Jacquelin,Stephanie	monaco@mls.com.mt	0033-6-097-86864

MOROCCO	AL HOCEIMA			
PORTUGAL	FIGUEIRA DA FOZ			
SLOVENIA	KOPER	Margon Sasa	koper@mls.com.mt	0386-0-41-661-639
SPAIN	ALGECIRAS			
SPAIN	ALICANTE	Sanchez Ruiz Alejandro	alicante@mls.com.mt	0034-636-48-776
SPAIN	ALMERIA	Del Amo Martinez Carlos	almeria@mls.com.mt	0034-610-239-502
SPAIN	ALTEA			
SPAIN	BARCELONA	Blanch Alfonso	barcelona@mls.com.mt	0034-629-464-146
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SPAIN	CADIZ	Benitez Roca Fernando	cadiz@mls.com.mt	0034-649-913-719
SPAIN	CARTAGENA		cartagena@mls.com.mt	
SPAIN	CASTELLON	Blanch Alfonso	castellon@mls.com.mt	0034-629-464-146
SPAIN	CEUTA			
SPAIN	FERROL	Blanch Alfonso	ferros@mls.com.mt	0034-629-464-146
SPAIN	IBIZA	Blanch Alfonso	ibiza@mls.com.mt	0034-629-464-146
SPAIN	MAHON			
SPAIN	MALAGA		malaga@mls.com.mt	
SPAIN	PALAMOS		palamos@mls.com.mt	
SPAIN	PALMA DE MALLORCA	Riera Tony	palma@mls.com.mt	0034-629-401-340
SPAIN	ROTA		rota@mls.com.mt	
SPAIN	SOLLER			
SPAIN	TARRAGONA		tarragona@mls.com.mt	
SPAIN	VALENCIA		valencia@mls.com.mt	
TUNISIA	BIZERTE	Kjeldsen Bennet	bizerte@mls.com.mt	00212-6-1-172-342
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TURKEY	GOLCUK	Goksel Ziya	golkuk@mls.com.mt	0090-265-1568
TURKEY	ISTANBUL	Goksel Ziya	istanbul@mls.com.mt	+90-212 244 2600/243 2118; Mob: +90 532 2319127
TURKEY	IZMIR	Akincioglu, Hasan	izmir@mls.com.mt	0090-532-215-5166
TURKEY	KABATEPE			
TURKEY	KARAAGAC			
TURKEY	MARMARIS	Akincioglu, Hasan	marmaris@mls.com.mt	0090-532-215-5166
TURKEY	MERSIN			

APPENDIX D

West Africa Husbanding Contractor' s List				
Country	6 th .Ports	Agent	Port E-mail	Agent Telephone
INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES (ISS) HEAD QUARTERS FOR ALL WEST AFRICAN PORTS <u>ALL INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE MUST BE WITH THIS OFFICE</u>	ALL	Jessica Farhadian Manish Khanna NOTE <u>ALL INITIAL CORRESPONDENCE MUST BE WITH THIS OFFICE</u>	Jessica.Farhadian@iss-shipping.com Manish.Khanna@iss-shipping.com	Off Tel: +44-1375-487-423 Off Tel: +44-1375-487-423Off Fax: +44-1375-487-404 Jessica Mob: +44-7801-397773 Manish Mob: +44-7801-397768
ANGOLA	ALL	Joao A. Oliveira	jagostinho@ami.ebonet.net	Off Tel: +244-2-447-523 Off Fax: +244-2-442-776 Mob: +244-9-508-556
BENIN	ALL	Daniel Audren	daniel.audren@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +229-313-793 Off Fax: +229-311-246 Mob: +229-912-597 Res: +229-330-489
CAMEROON	ALL	Eric Vom Hoevel	eric.vom-hoevel@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +237-420-510 Off Fax: +237-429-815 Mob: +237-911-277 Res: +237-370-164
CAPE VERDE	ALL	Mark Porral (ISS coordination unit based in Gibraltar)	iberia.navy@iss-shipping.com mark.porral@iss-shipping.com	Off Tel: +350-79294 Off Fax: +350-46316 Mob: +34-6-539-407 Mob: +350-58919
CAPE VERDE ISLANDS	ALL	Valdemiro Ferreira	vikingcv@hotmail.com	Off Tel: +238-31-7118 / 7119 Off Fax: +238-31-7120 Mob: +238-91-2053
D. R. CONGO	ALL	R. Mouyabi Z. Nguimbi	richard.mouyabi@smtp.saga.fr zephirin.nguimbi@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +242-94-08-55 Off Fax: +242 – 94-3404 Sat Tel: +871-761-373-498 Sat Fax: +871-761-373-510 Mob: +242-42-9172 Res: +242-94-2665

EQUITORIAL GUINEA	ALL	D Webster		Off Tel: +240-912-47 Off Tel: +240-926-82 Off Fax: +240-916-46 Mob: +240-952-54
GABON	Port Gentil	Josephe Rouzaud	josephe.rouzaud@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +241-55-2190 Off Fax: +241-55-2171 Mob: +241-36-1331
GAMBIA	ALL	N Langarddaard-Sorensen	gamship@ganet.gm	Off Tel: +220-22-7432 Off Fax: +220-22-7929 Res: +220-49-6339
GHANA	ALL	Alfred Acheampong	alfred.acheampong@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +233-22-204-130 Off Fax: +233-22-202-175 Mob: +233-27-200-149
GUINEA	ALL	A. Niane	abdoulaye.niane@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +224-41-2457 Off Fax: +224-41-2025 Mob: +224-011-212-247
GUINEA BISSAU	ALL	Makarem		Off Tel: +245-20-1135 Off Fax: +245-20-1057 Mob: +34-9-61-665-0353
IVORY COAST	ALL	Jean-philippe Ducrest Oliver Sou	jean-philippe.ducrest@smtp.saga.fr oliver.sou@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +225-21-241-459 Off Fax: +225-21-242-506 Mob: +225-07-690-021 Res: +225-22-415-233
LIBERIA	ALL	Roy Chalkley	rchalkley@afmlink.com umarco@libnet.net	Off Tel: +231-22-6056 / 6472 Off Fax: +231-22-7112
MAURITANIA	ALL	M. M' boyrick	sogeco@opt.mr	Off Tel: +222-2-54652 Off Fax: +222-2-53903 Res: +222-2-52500
NAMIBIA		Alan Vermaak (ISS coordination unit based in Cape Town, South Africa)	allan.vermaak@iss-shipping.com	Off Tel: +27-21-421-2269 Off Fax: +27-21-421-2370 Mob: +27-82-225-1524 Res: +27-21-557-4887
NIGERIA	ALL	Sonny Svensson Mark Peverett	SOS.@otal.com map.ni@otal.com	Off Tel: +234-1-587-2925 Off Fax: +234-587-3294 Sonny Mob: +234-1-775-3927 Mark Mob: +234-1-775-0748

SENEGAL	ALL	Papa Mbaye	papa-ndiaga.mbaye@smtp.saga.fr	Off Tel: +221-849-3390 Off Fax: +221-832-5129 Mob: +221-638-7048 Res: +221-835-4028
SIERRA LEONE	ALL	Christian Overgaard C.A. Max Williams	chrslsa@sierratel.sl slsa@sierratel.sl	Off Tel: +232-22-22-3088 Off Tel: +232-22-22-4656 Off Fax: +232-22-22-0021 Mob: +232-23-50-1175 Res: +232-22-23-0301 Res: +232-22-23-1842
TOGO	ALL	Sewa Wilson		

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APPENDIX E

HUSBANDING CONTRACTS - SOUTHWEST ASIA

UPDATED 20 NOV 2001		
	CONTRACTOR	E-MAIL
SOUTH AFRICA EXPIRED	N68171-96-D- JOHN T. RENNIE AND SONS P.O.C. MR. JAMES WHITE	NONE
ERITREA EXPIRED	N68171-96-D-A010 ERITREA SHIPPING & TRANSIT SVC	N/A
KUWAIT 30 NOV 02	N68171-02-D-A001 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES P.O.C. MR. CHRIS STONE GEN MANAGER - CHRIS STONE	ganga.allakkot@iss-shipping.com Chris.Stone@iss-shipping.com
SAUDI ARABIA - DAMMAM AND JUBAIL 30 NOV 02	N49400-02-D-A003 KANOO SHIPPING AGENCY POC: BABU GEORGE SUKUMAR MENON	ksajub@kanoosa.com ksadam@kanoosa.com
OMAN 20 JUN 2000	N68171-97-D-A022 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES P.O.C. - NICK CARPENTER- FRANK	thomasm@issoman.com
YEMEN EXPIRED	N68171-00-D-A012 AL MANSOOB COMMERCIAL GROUP P.O.C. - AHMED AL MANSOOB	MansoobCG@hotmail.com Almansoob@y.net.ye
SEYCHELLES 31 JUL 2000	N68171-99-D-A028 MAHE SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD SHIPPING HOUSE P.O.C. MR. GERRY ADAM	maheship@seychelles.net
DOHA, QATAR 30 NOV 02	N68171-02-D-A002 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES P.O.C. MR. AKBAR KHAN	art6999@batelco.com.bh

KENYA	N49400-02-D-A006	david.mackay@iss-shipping.co.ke
30 NOV 2002	INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES, KENYA	
	P.O.C. MR. DAVID MACKAY	
BAHRAIN	N68171-99-D-A001	
31 OCT 2000	A.R. TOORANI	art6999@batelco.com.bh
	P.O.C. MR. A.R. Toorani	
	or Mr. M Toorani	
DJIBOUTI	N49400-02-D-A007	iss@intnet.dj
30 NOV 2002	INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES	Ahmed Osman Guelleh
	P.O.C. MR. AHMED OSMAN GUELLEH	
UAE	N68171-00-D-A008	akbar.khan@iss-shipping.com
30 NOV 2000	INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES	
	MARITIME & MERCANTILE INTL L.L.C.	
	P.O.C. MR. AKBAR KHAN	
EGYPT	N68171-99-D-A121	mitjrson@ritsec3.com.eg
31 DEC 2000	MITCHELL JR. COMPANY	
	P.O.C. MR. ADEL ABDOU EL LAMEI	
SAUDI ARABIA - JEDDAH	N68171-97-D-L001	jeddah.ops@gulfagencycompany.com
31 MAY 2001	GULF AGENCY COMPANY	
	POC: ABDUL LATIF KHAN	
SAUDI ARABIA - YANBU	N68171-97-D-L005	
31 MAY 2001	GULF AGENCY COMPANY	
	POC: ABDUL LATIF KHAN	
JORDAN, AQABA	N68171-00-D-A027	
	GULF AGENCY COMPANY	
	POC: ISSAM KAWAR	

APPENDIX F

Country/City	Fresh Fruits & Veg.	Husbanding Services	Other
Australia			Five Port Award
Melbourne & Brisbane	FFV Document		
Cairns	FFV Document		
Brunei		HSDocument	Document
Indonesia Contract Award SF1449		HS Document	Services
Malaysia		HS Document	Document
Phillippines			
	Spreadsheet Document	Document Spreadsheet	
Singapore			

Bread	Document	Breasting Barge Cell Phones CHT	Oily Waste Transportation Water Taxi
Thailand		Document	Document
Phuket	Spreadsheet Document		
Pattaya	Document Spreadsheet		

APPENDIX G

F. SURVEY SAID FOR WINDOWS AND THE WEB

1. What is your rank?

☐ E-4

☐ E-5

☐ E-6

☐ E-7

☐ E-8

☐ E-9

2. Total time in service (years, months):

3. Total time in 3044 MOS (years, months):

**4. Have you done any deployments as a contract specialist not with a MEU?
Include time PCS'd overseas.**

☐ Yes

☐ No

5. If you have you done any deployments as a contract specialist not with a MEU, please list and provide duration of deployment and warrant amount if applicable.

6. Was the chance to deploy a major consideration for moving to the 3044 field?

☐ Yes

☐ No

7. Do you believe 3044s deploy too often, not enough, or just enough?

☐ Too often

☐ Not enough

☐ Just enough

8. How many deployments did you do as a MEU Contracting Specialist?

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4 or more

9. What dollar value was your warrant for each deployment?

10. As MEU contract specialist did you write any contracts that exceeded the simplified acquisition threshold of \$100,000? If your authority was less than \$100,000, how was the requirement contracted?

11. Did the MEU SupO or any other organic MEU personnel also have a contracting warrant? If so, what dollar amount?

12. Did the Amphibious Ready Group ships split up during your deployment? If so did this cause you to be separated from the MEU SupO?

13. How did you feel about your workload as a MEU contract specialist?

- ☐ I was in over my head
- ☐ It was among the most challenging assignments I have had in the Marine Corps
- ☐ It was moderately challenging
- ☐ It was just right
- ☐ I was constantly looking for things to occupy my time
- ☐ My talents were completely wasted

14. What most accurately reflects your desire to go back out on another deployment as a MEU contract specialist?

- ☐ Would seek out an opportunity
- ☐ Happy with some reservations
- ☐ No strong feeling, just another billet
- ☐ Would rather not
- ☐ Would get out of the Corps first

15. Which most accurately reflects your attitude about recommending a tour with a MEU to your fellow 3044s?

- ☐ Would highly encourage another 3044 to go out with a MEU
- ☐ Would encourage it
- ☐ No opinion
- ☐ Would not encourage
- ☐ Would fully discourage

16. What difficulties if any did you have contracting in support of a MEU?

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5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC
Quantico, Virginia
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer)
Camp Pendleton, California
7. Professor Jeffrey R. Cuskey
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
8. Professor David V. Lamm (Code GB/Lt)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California